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Foreword

From the Director
U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center

Persistent Conflict. The strategic environment confronting the Army today is vastly different from that of the cold war era. Increasingly, we see protracted confrontations among state and non-state actors fueled by expanding ideological and political extremism, competition for energy, globalization of economies, climate and demographic changes, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or effects, and the increasing use of violence to achieve political and ideological outcomes. Our leaders expect these types of conflicts to predominate for at least the next several decades.

The Battle of Ideas. Given this new environment, it is of growing importance that we pause to understand the complexity of current and future operational challenges and their strategic contexts before we act. Accordingly, the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) is charged with developing the future concepts to address those challenges. The precursors for these concepts are emerging ideas, and ideas are what TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-300 is all about. Annually, ARCIC’s Future Warfare Division plans and conducts the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Future Warfare Study, UNIFIED QUEST under Title 10, United States Code §485. This series of conferences, seminars, and war games culminates with a capstone event for senior leaders held each spring at the U.S. Army War College. In past years, ARCIC has captured the ideas synthesized from each yearly series in a white paper with relatively limited distribution. This year, for the first time, we are publishing the key ideas emerging from UNIFIED QUEST in a TRADOC pamphlet intended for wider dissemination to the larger military, interagency, and academic communities.

Glimpse of the Future. While our vision of the future will never be exactly 20/20, the insights gained during UNIFIED QUEST from our experienced Soldier-leaders, academic and industry experts, multinational participants, government officials, and others will help us scout the future in order to gain a clearer picture of what we may face in the future, and what to do about it now. We owe it to the American people whom we protect; to our allies, coalition partners and friends; and to our precious Soldiers to do all we can to get it right. Through the conduct of UNIFIED QUEST and the publication of this pamphlet, we are working to fulfill our sacred obligation to meet that challenge.

Michael A. Vane
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Director, Army Capabilities Integration Center
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Military Operations

THE UNITED STATES ARMY FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS
UNIFIED QUEST 2007

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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History. This publication is a new United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) pamphlet.

Summary. TRADOC Pamphlet (Pam) 525-5-300, The United States Army Full Spectrum Operations Unified Quest 2007 serves to report the intellectual development of key emerging ideas relating to full spectrum operations resulting from discussions and events as part of the UNIFIED QUEST 2007 Army Capstone War Game under Title 10, United States Code §485 (Joint Warfighting Experimentation). These are ideas which may point the way to concepts and doctrine for the future Modular Force, or simply serve to inspire further discussion and development of ideas in the course of future war game events. The pre-concept ideas based specifically on the discussions surrounding the UNIFIED QUEST war game reflected by this publication differentiate it from the typical 525-series of TRADOC pamphlets currently in publication which define and describe the current, approved operational and functional concepts for the Army.

Applicability. Although this publication contains products of the Army’s annual Capstone War Game series, it is intended for use by any multinational, interagency, joint, or single service organization charged with examining or implementing emerging ideas and concepts for full spectrum operations in the future.
Administrative information. Required and related publications and required and referenced forms are listed in appendix A. Abbreviations and terms used in this pamphlet are explained in the glossary. Unless stated otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

Proponent. The proponent of this pamphlet is the Director, Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate, Future Warfare Division (ATFC-EF), 33 Ingalls Road, Suite 215, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-1046.

Suggested improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Director, ARCIC, Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate, Future Warfare Division (ATFC-EF), 33 Ingalls Road, Suite 215, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-1046. Suggested improvements may also be submitted using DA Form 1045 (Army Ideas for Excellence Program Proposal).

Distribution. This publication is only available on the TRADOC Homepage at http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pamndx.htm.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1-1. Purpose

a. This publication provides observations and insights gained during the conduct of the Army’s Annual Title 10 United States Code (USC) Capstone War Game, UNIFIED QUEST 2007, and its associated events. It also serves to continue development of the ideas emerging from the 2007 Future Warfare Study Plan (FWSP) in order to identify potential directions in which the military ought to continue to seek solutions to problems identified during the course of the year. It is not the purpose of this pamphlet to modify TRADOC Pamphlet (Pam) 525-3-0, The Army in Joint Operations: The Army’s Future Force Capstone Concept 2015-2024 or approved operational and functional concepts. Rather, it is to open up discourse in the arena of ideas, to examine what might be needed by the military, rather than plan for what will likely be required.

b. UNIFIED QUEST (UQ) is the title given to the annual series of workshops, seminars, seminar war games, staff planning exercises, and, in the end, a moderated seminar war game conducted specifically for the Chief of Staff, United States Army (CSA), and others who either hold key leadership and policy development positions or influence those who hold them. Throughout the course of the year, UQ events follow the pattern and guidance laid out by the FWSP, developed annually by staff of the Future Warfare Division (FWD) of the Army Capability Integration Center (ARCIC). This plan guides the Army’s continuing study of the implications of the emerging and future strategic environment for the transforming Army, generally looking 15-30 years in the future, in order to determine any significant trends which might necessitate the development of new concepts. This, in turn, gives the Army what should be sufficient lead time to develop, test, and implement concepts and determine the need for specific, timely solutions. Figure 1-1 below depicts the UQ 2007 series of events.

c. The FWSP and the game begin each annual cycle immediately following the concluding activity of the previous study year, which generally runs annually from June of one year through May of the next year. In the culminating event for UQ, the Senior Leader Seminar (SLS), the study team engages the CSA and senior leaders from the Department of Defense and other government agencies in a discussion of the most significant and pressing insights from the study activities of the year. The intent of this engagement is three-fold:

• **Inform.** First, it is to inform the leadership of what the study revealed.
• **Inquire.** Second, it is to elicit guidance on what to do about these revelations.
• **Initiate.** Third, it is to initiate exploration for the next cycle. This third function is the first in a series of engagements with the CSA that establishes the mission, intent, and direction for the FWSP for the next study year.

d. For UQ 2007, the CSA asked that the game and the plan focus on the near- and mid-terms. He directed this to enable a shared understanding of the emerging enemy and the environment involved in the conduct of what had been called “this long war.” Within that context, the study was to determine how to use the military more effectively in conjunction with the other instruments of National power, with the objective being to achieve a balanced,
government approach. The study would also identify challenges affecting the military’s, and specifically the Army’s, ability to conduct full spectrum operations (FSO) as defined and described in FM 3-0. It should also explore the human dimension within distributed operations and the stresses and demands that the enemy and environment place on the ability of the U.S. to maintain the right kind of all volunteer force.

1-2. Overview
The United States (U.S.) Army, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) co-sponsored UQ 2007. The FWD of ARCIC, in conjunction with the Futures Center of USSOCOM and the Joint Experimentation Directorate of USJFCOM, conducted the series of events that comprised UQ 2007, as depicted graphically above. Events were:

a. **Nature of the Long War Seminar, 5-8 December 2006.** The Nature of the Long War Seminar began the process of developing the *shared understanding.* The study team designed it as a forum for notable experts in international relations, human conflict, technological development, and military art and science to discuss the nature of the conflict dubbed “this long war;” the drivers of that conflict; and the trends that indicate how the conflict might evolve.

b. **Strategic Guidance Seminar, 8-11 January 2007.** Having framed the problem with the Nature of the Long War Seminar, the study team conducted the Strategic Guidance Seminar to explore alternative strategic approaches to averting or resolving the conflict which was being depicted, and to develop potential policy alternatives. Three teams of experts from various national security disciplines (many of whom had participated in the previous seminar) developed three different national strategic approaches that the U.S. might use (see chap 4). From those alternatives, the study team derived a set of implied requirements for military forces and the framework for strategic guidance for the conduct of follow-on UQ war-gaming events.

c. **Unconventional Warfare Seminar War Game, 5-8 February 2007.** USSOCOM sponsored the Unconventional Warfare Seminar War Game (SWG) to enhance the knowledge and understanding of the universal characteristics of successful unconventional warfare (UW) campaigns; identify planning considerations in constructing a UW campaign; and examine differences among UW activities in three operational contexts. Three distinct teams of experts considered scenarios involving an independent UW campaign; a UW campaign supported by conventional operations; and UW operations supporting a conventional campaign, respectively.

d. **Defeating an Insurgency Seminar War Game, 20-23 February 2007.** In the Defeating an Insurgency Seminar War Game, teams of experts considered three different problem sets representing insurgencies in various stages and settings. The objectives of the SWG were to explore changing the conditions as a key to success in defeating *insurgencies* (vice *insurgents*); identify the implications for the U.S. military in conducting counterinsurgency and stability, support, transition, and reconstruction operations (SSTRO) without interagency support; and explore different approaches to defeating and isolating insurgents and preventing the reemergence of an insurgency.
c. **Staff Planning Exercise, 17-25 March 2007.** To prepare and set the initial conditions for conduct of the Capstone War Game, the study team conducted a staff planning exercise (STAFFEX) in which four operational panels, representing geographic combatant commands (GCC), developed an appreciation for the strategic context and the problems presented to them as well as roles they would play in resolving those problems. Based on that appreciation, the panels developed initial campaign designs on which they would base detailed execution plans for use later in the Capstone War Game.

f. **Noble Resolve 2007, 23-27 April 2007.** USJFCOM sponsored exercise Noble Resolve 2007 in coordination with the U.S. Department of State, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Northern Command, and the Commonwealth of Virginia, in order to explore issues of information sharing and maritime domain awareness. This exercise gave participants key insights into interagency cooperation that would serve them well in the UQ 2007 Capstone War Game.

g. **Capstone War Game, 29 April-4 May 2007.** The study team conducted the Capstone War Game in order to:

- Describe how the long war could dynamically evolve over the period 2008-2016.
- Explore the interrelated ideas of UW and building partnership capacity (BPC) for persistent security as the foundation for campaigning in the timeframe 2008-2016.
• Examine multiple, simultaneous, distributed operations and the stresses and demands they place on the nation’s ability to maintain a quality all-volunteer military force.
• Identify potential gaps in military capabilities for conducting FSO, assuming either full or minimal-to-non-existent interagency support.
• Identify potential gaps in joint and Army doctrine for problem framing during crisis action planning for operational-level campaigns and problem re-framing during execution.

(1) The strategic setting for the Capstone War Game was comprised of multiple, interrelated problem sets. These scenarios included competition among major powers for resources and markets; continued conflict fueled by Islamic radicalism and other emerging revolutionary ideologies; increasing concern over failed and failing states and the resulting ungoverned regions and areas; continuing proliferation of nuclear capability and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and weapons of mass effect (WME); and international crime. These problems were driven and/or enhanced by situations of dramatic demographic changes; increasing urbanization; ecological deterioration and regional climate shifts; and other challenges to the international system of states (see fig 1-2).

(2) The war-game design consisted of four regional panels, each considering different theater strategic and/or operational problem sets and settings, and a global strategic panel (related, but not connected to the regional panels) considering the demands of the strategic environment and their implications for FSO (within the context of the national strategy developed at the Strategic Guidance Seminar). See figure 1-3 for a better understanding of the organization for execution for the Capstone War Game.
1-3. Counterinsurgency Theory

a. In order to establish a baseline of counterinsurgency theory, the UQ 2007 study team began its investigation with a review of David Galula’s *Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958.*

   Although the strategic context for Galula’s observations and experience reflects only a subset of that which the U.S. will face in the future, much of his theory rings true and provides a sound point of departure for developing concepts for the use of the military in “this long war.”

b. The indigenous population is both the object and the context of a counterinsurgency campaign. Galula divided the population conceptually into three broad groupings: a minority disposed to support the insurgent, an uncommitted majority, and a minority disposed to support the counterinsurgent. In order to succeed, the counterinsurgent must deny the support of the majority to the insurgent if not win the support for himself. Influence over the majority is most likely gained by an indigenous minority dedicated to the counterinsurgent’s cause, but that minority will emerge and be followed by the majority only if both perceive the counterinsurgent as the ultimate victor.

c. Counterinsurgency requires an intensive effort, and rarely will a force be so superior as to be able to saturate the entire area of conflict. To succeed, the force must destroy or expel the main insurgent force, control the population, and gain the population’s support for the counterinsurgency. Limitations of the available force may require an approach that concentrates the force in one locality or province at a time. There are inherent risks with such an approach, not the least of which is the risk of areas reverting to insurgent control when the effort shifts. There is also a significant risk that over the extended campaign, the political will of the counterinsurgent will wane.

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d. From the study of Galula and related counterinsurgent theory, the study team derived key points to consider as it continued to explore the nature of the long war and its implications.

- Destruction of the insurgent force is only part of the solution and the small unit is central to that fight.
- The insurgent’s tactics will vary from place to place and will evolve over time; the counterinsurgency force must be able to adapt.
- The key to success is broad support for the counterinsurgency effort among the indigenous population and that support will require significant effort over an extended period; sustaining the effort will require shared risk among all of the interested parties (indigenous, regional, and international).
- The majority of the population must perceive the counterinsurgency as the ultimate victor before it will commit to its support.
- Finally, the counterinsurgency force, along with its supporting indigenous population, must be robust enough to sustain previous gains while it continues to secure new territory.

1-4. Depicting the Insights and Lessons
Subsequent chapters of this publication depict the major insights and lessons gleaned from the UQ 2007 events that point to the key ideas in need of either development into full operational or functional concepts or marking for further study. These are organized as follows:

- Characterizing the notion of persistent conflict.
- Strategic considerations involved in development of a viable national military strategy (NMS).
- Examining possible future employment of military force in FSO.
- Developing the idea of persistent security and its role in minimizing or averting conflict.
- Creating advisory and assistance organizations, as well as enhancing and applying civil affairs (CA) capabilities, in order to support BPC, with or without interagency support.
- Considering a more robust approach to campaign planning which relies on modern approaches to operational design.

Chapter 2
Insights

2-1. General
Over the series of events that comprised UQ 2007, from discussions, products, and observations of participants, the study team synthesized a number of insights relevant to the study objectives and questions. These key insights were among the topics senior study participants discussed with the CSA and other senior national security officials in the SLS conducted as the culminating event of the Capstone War Game.
2-2. Consideration for a National Military Strategy (NMS)

a. In consideration of the long-term military strategy the nation should take, there was a requirement to characterize the nature of the problem likely to face U.S. policy makers. Much of the year’s study was devoted to that characterization.

b. The primary insight into the nature of modern conflict gleaned from this effort is best described by borrowing the arguments set forth by Rupert Smith in his book *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*. Confrontation occurs when two or more bodies are pursuing mutually exclusive outcomes. That confrontation might be characterized as ideological, civilizational, religious, or political. When the bodies in confrontation cannot find common ground or accept compromise, one or the other may turn to force of arms (armed conflict) to resolve the matter on terms acceptable to them. A traditional state power in conflict uses military forces against another’s to achieve strategic decision in resolution of the conflict – and, ideally, the original confrontation. While none of these notions is new, the nature of modern conflict reveals some aspects that are new.

c. Trends such as globalization, technological revolution, ubiquitous media and information networks, and the mobility of populations add complexity to the strategic environment and have made confrontations between dissimilar bodies (states and non-state actors) of more immediate national security concern. They have also increased the ability of weaker bodies to compete in armed conflict. The strategies of the weaker force – such as guerrilla warfare, terrorism, avoiding direct engagement, blending in with the general population, targeting the economy and the general population – are all designed to offset conventional military strengths. The leveling effects of these strategies are compounded by the historical international conventions and institutions that were designed to constrain traditional nation-states in conflict, which have been and are still very effective in doing so. Those conventions and institutions have little effect, however, in constraining trans-national and non-state actors.

d. The result is a strategic environment of continuous confrontation with the potential for persistent conflict in which major state powers are constrained (both domestically and internationally) from decisive military action and rapid resolution (see chap 3 for an expanded description of the strategic environment and how it may evolve). There is, then, a need to accept the premise and develop a general concept for the application of military force to constrain conflict and foster a secure environment, setting conditions in which other instrumentalities of national and international power can work to resolve the underlying confrontations. Within this context, the military will require capabilities and proficiencies to act up and down the spectrum of conflict, seamlessly transitioning between operational types and themes.

e. Therefore, the implications for a National Security Strategy (NSS) begin with a need for the U.S. to forge strategic consensus, both domestically and with its allies. That suggests a need for a different narrative that engenders broad, enduring agreement and support, domestically,

---

3 An argument exists, alluded to by some participants, but not fully explored in this study, that the modern state is loosing its monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence.
internationally, and within the region of a conflict. The emerging strategic environment demands a fully integrated military and political response. The NMS should link to interagency processes to ensure unity of effort and unity of vision. Finally, the current NSS needs to expand to include a unifying narrative and provide a vision in which the Department of Defense (DOD) can nest the NMS (see chap 4 for alternative strategies that the U.S. might pursue within the emerging strategic environment).

f. Likewise, the nature of modern conflict has implications for how the Army postures itself to meet the requirements of the strategy. The Army is at strategic crossroads. As the nation contemplates increasing Army and Marine Corps end strength, and as forces return from overseas locations, it needs to determine how best to align and distribute those forces to meet the mission sets required for FSO. It also needs to rethink how to posture the force globally, to include forward basing.

g. The Army must retool the force to address irregular challenges (for example, supporting enabling capacity building activities) while maintaining its other core capabilities. The Army must determine whether the 75,000 increase in Army end strength approved in 2007 is enough and whether the active to reserve component ratio is correct for protracted commitments. DOD must extend the deliberation on balancing the force to include the other services as well.

h. At the same time, U.S. policy makers must rethink our global presence posture. Forward presence provides a means for establishing relationships, gaining cultural appreciation, fostering U.S. ideals of freedom, providing a mechanism for regional shaping, and providing a structure for building indigenous capacity to manage conflict. In conjunction with U.S. Government (USG) interagency partners and the unified commands, the Army should consider alternative basing options and strategies for enhanced forward presence.

2-3. Understanding Strategic-level Complexities of Persistent Conflict

a. Legal justification is necessary, but not sufficient, to establish the legitimacy required to sustain commitment to military activity within protracted conflicts. Legitimacy is a product of the perception of both legal and moral justification from domestic, regional, and international perspectives. When contemplating military intervention, policy makers should consider requirements to conform to international law and local and regional consent; broad consensus cultivated within the international community, interagency partners, and military allies; the need for building a strong coalition, with substantial troop contributing nations’ forces and balanced participation; as well as the possible need for seeking a United Nations backed mandate, United Nations Security Council resolution, or recognized consensus from treaty or coalition partners.

b. Throughout the entire FWSP, UQ participants recognized the importance of coalitions, partners, and allies in sustaining military operations in protracted conflicts. One challenge is characterized by the term capable but unwilling partners and allies. Another involves acting in partnership with those who are willing but lack real capabilities. The USG must sustain relations and enhance interoperability with key allies while helping to build regional and local partnership capacity in potential zones of conflict. The USG will seek to work within the context of existing multilateral institutions, alliances, or collective security mechanisms – United
Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North American Aerospace Defense Command, America, Britain, Canada, and Australia program, as well as various regional collective security mechanisms such as the Organization of American States, African Union, and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. We should also seek to forge strong, bilateral relationships to reinforce and complement our multilateral partnerships.

c. Irregular warfare will fundamentally challenge military service culture. Future operational commanders will need the ability to operate by, with, and through a variety of actors (both state and non-state) in order to achieve U.S. strategic objectives. Leaders must transcend the current military culture and be effective outside the military organization to be able to influence the action of others, both of the coalition and within USG, absent directive authority and/or control. All of these require better appreciation of the political, cultural, economic, and informational context of the operation.

2-4. Building Capacity for Strategic Depth
In order to employ FSO effectively, the Army will need to enhance its capacity for strategic depth. Over the course of the study, three ideas for building that capacity emerged.


(1) Although nominally a general-purpose force, the Army currently is challenged to operate with equal proficiency across all likely major mission areas (MMA).\(^4\) In Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army has magnificently improvised as it adapted to emerging mission requirements. Nevertheless, that adaptation took time and provided opportunities for the enemy to exploit seams during a sensitive period, and its unintended fallout has been to degrade significantly the Army's readiness for high-intensity combined arms operations.

(2) Neither people nor organizations are infinitely versatile, and given that its force structure is and will remain constrained, the Army needs a mechanism to insure that at any given time, some portion of the brigade combat teams (BCT) that comprise the bulk of the Army's combat power is proficient in each likely MMA. Allocation of BCTs among these MMAs should vary periodically in accordance with ongoing strategic assessments and tolerance for risk. Over time, however, every BCT should be expected to become proficient in every MMA, gradually expanding the Army's overall institutional and individual experience in each of them.

(3) U.S. Forces Command currently uses the readiness cycle within the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model to prepare forces for known deployments in support of ongoing operations. In the future, when missions and deployments are less predictable, the Army will need to determine, through appropriate risk analysis, an optimal distribution of BCTs, as well as other Modular Force elements, across MMAs. The Army must exploit modularity by developing doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel, and facility

\(^4\) Major mission area is not a doctrinal term. Its use implies taxonomy of strategic tasks and conditions, with clear distinctions among operational characteristics (for example, combined arms operations; security, support, transition and reconstruction operations; foreign internal defense; counterinsurgency; etc.) that would require forces with unique sets of capabilities and qualities.
(DOTMLPF) reconfiguration templates appropriate to each MMA and use these to reconfigure forces in accordance with risk analysis and in coordination with ARFORGEN.

4. The Army should develop and codify transition support modules (people, equipment, and training) designed to facilitate rapid reconfiguration from one MMA to another, together with standing transition support teams (on the model of new equipment training team or the British Army’s Operational Training Assistance Group) to help BCTs through the transition process.

b. Improving CA Capabilities and Capacity.

1. Senior participants in the game identified a need to expand the Army’s CA capabilities to support FSO. There is a period in contingency operations during which the primary focus is on establishing a safe and secure environment in which other instruments of national power can offer their capabilities to function with indigenous peoples. Many of the competencies of these other departments and agencies are essential for establishing and/or restoring legitimate governance, services, and viable peace. The Army must be able to replicate, even temporarily, the basic functions of other USG departments and agencies that may not be present in the theater of operations, out among the populations, when conditions are not conducive to introduction of civilian agencies. With the exception of U.S. Agency for International Development, other USG departments and agencies have little, if any, contingency capacity. They deploy volunteers – out-of-hide – for short duration, which severely limits effective interaction with the populace and may not engender trust and confidence in the USG’s long-term commitment to the country or region. Other USG departments and agencies have expertise for which the Army currently has very limited, if any, capacity due to its restructuring and refocusing of CA doctrine and organization over the past couple of decades (see chap 8 for more in-depth discussion of the requirements for expanded civil affairs capabilities and capacity).

2. The challenge is in determining what capabilities and to what capacity the Army should commit force structure in the future to compensate for the lack of resources from other USG departments and agencies. However, the Army needs to be circumspect about what capabilities it develops for stabilization and reconstruction – it should not assume total responsibility for all aspects of civil administration.

3. The primary capabilities that the Army should have include: civil policing, construction to facilitate freedom of movement, commerce, and humanitarian relief (shelter), power production and distribution, water treatment/purification and distribution (public health), food distribution, waste removal or treatment, and medical care (general practice). The Army should develop CA capability to mobilize a population to support its own needs with only minor assistance or intervention by the U.S. Army. It requires research into previous CA doctrine and identification of ideas to bring forward into current concepts and doctrine. The Army should examine CA organizational structures and manning policies to determine innovative ways of making people with specialized civil skills available for employment, for example direct commissioning and limited duty status to mid-grade.
c. **Future Theater Military Assistance and Advisory Group (TMAAG-F).**

(1) Senior participants determined that theater armies need small, tailored forces to optimize contributions to the struggle against instability and insurgency. The Army has a strategic opportunity, with approved growth, to build low-cost, small-footprint, high-impact regional advisory and assistance groups for the GCC.

(2) Both U.S. Army general-purpose forces and special operations forces (SOF) are returning most forward-deployed forces to the continental United States (CONUS). To understand the operational environment and optimally react to adversary initiatives, the U.S. Army will need cadres of theater specialists that have language, cultural, social, operational, and historical acumen, who can be tapped for capacity building, in crisis, and for planning and execution of deliberate operations. Ideally, personnel assigned to advisory and assistance groups would be earmarked for repetitive tours for long-term development of on the ground experience, language and cultural expertise (see chap 7 for further development of the idea of TMAAG-F).

(3) The Army should continue to study this idea in the next cycle of UQ and develop the organizational concept in coordination with USSOCOM and the GCCs (particularly U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Africa Command).

### 2-5. Achieving Unity of Effort

A constant theme from study to study has been the challenge of achieving a unity of effort among the military, other government agencies, and coalition and indigenous partners. In previous years, the UQ sponsors explored various ideas with respect to new organizations and authorities as possible solutions to that challenge, but there were significant barriers to implementing those solutions. In UQ 2007, participants explored two ideas that might serve to enhance unity of effort without enforcing unity of command: campaign design and information engagement.

a. **Campaign Design.**

(1) Military forces currently, and will for the foreseeable future, operate within a highly complex strategic context. The commander will need to develop a full appreciation of the adversary, the environment, and himself (the forces he controls, as well as partners with whom he will operate) in order to appreciate fully the strategic problem and his role in its resolution.

(2) The commander gains this appreciation through an analysis of what he has been tasked to do and a synthesis of the systems that comprise the strategic and operational environments in which he will act. Both processes are essential to his holistic understanding of the problem and they inform his envisioned end state and his operational design. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500 provides a full discussion of the approach to commander’s appreciation and campaign design developed and applied in the past two UQ study cycles. (See chap 9 for additional insights).

(3) As a campaign unfolds, the system comprised of self, adversary, and environment will evolve and adapt. The commander must continually assess the system to determine if the
framework of his understanding remains valid or if he should reframe the system and modify his campaign design.

(4) This approach to strategic commander’s appreciation and campaign design (CACD) at the theater strategic and operational levels of war, with its greater emphasis on the commander’s insight rather than reliance on past methods which emphasize staff estimates as part of the military decisionmaking process implies a need to change operational design and operational planning concepts and doctrine. The construct requires an active discourse with civilian leadership, as well as other government departments and agencies. The Army should establish that discourse as an imperative within its campaign planning doctrine and advocate the inclusion of that imperative in joint doctrine and executive policy, while evaluating its applicability in higher level venues of professional military education.

b. Information Engagement (such as, public information, public diplomacy, and psychological operations (PSYOPS)).

(1) Senior participants identified a need to reconsider the foundations of our concept of information engagement. Our current doctrine and procedures do not explicitly recognize the natural unity of actions and words. It is our nature to think of actions first and supporting messages second. It is our adversary’s nature to act in ways that support his message. Military actions are really a way of speaking in a larger political context – and they frequently convey a very strong message. In the future, we must consider the message of our actions during our framing of the problem, not just in development of supporting plans. We should establish the narrative first, and then evaluate all potential actions against it.

(2) Fighting smart against implacable foes implies a coordinated two-armed approach. Messages should influence choices while concrete actions should constrain or limit choices.

(3) It is becoming more important, yet more difficult to engage the public at home, abroad, and in the bazaar or village with a coherent message. The “global village” nature of the information environment makes a coherent and truthful supporting narrative critical. Coordinating that message through centralized “message control” will be slow and ineffective. A more promising approach is analogous to “mission command” that provides centralized control of intent and decentralized control of tailored messages by educated agents. This relies, however, on being what we say we are at all levels, showing the public, theirs and ours, a sort of refreshing transparency which makes our efforts difficult to oppose.

(4) Indirect information engagement (conducted by, with, and through other actors) provides unique challenges and opportunities, and has significant implications for Army forces. The challenges associated with conducting information engagement and associated activities and actions are heightened when they are conducted outside normal channels. If we can overcome those challenges, there are considerable opportunities that these operations afford us in joining and unifying these efforts with host nation, interagency, coalition partners, and proxies. However, not all activities and actions can be conducted in this manner (for example, PSYOPS).
The Army should develop methodologies that provide the opportunity, during early staff process, to include the exploration of the message as part of the framing phase of campaign design. It will also take a concerted lobbying effort on the part of DOD with the U.S. Congress to examine the possibility of studying a more functional alignment of current legal guidelines and restrictions with respect to PSYOPS, public affairs operations, information and influence operations, and other operations involved with propagating the message without changing seriously the “American way” of expressing the message.

2-6. Conclusions

a. The Army must continue the examination that explores the current strategic environment and how it may evolve in the future in order to gain consensus on the nature of the problems it will face and to understand their implications. As our national security institutions formulate the next NSS, the Army should use the results of its examination to inform that process. It should advocate a narrative that will serve to unify the political and military response and engender national, international, and regional support.

b. Within the context of persistent conflict, the Army should further develop the concept of FSO, incorporating the idea of persistent security, the application of military force to constrain conflict and foster a secure environment in which other instruments of national, international, and regional power can work to resolve the underlying confrontation. The Army should determine how best to align, distribute, and posture forces for FSO in the emerging strategic environment.

c. The Army, in cooperation with USSOCOM, USJFCOM, and the GCCs should develop capabilities for BPC as a means of achieving national security objectives. To employ those capabilities, the military will need leaders who can effectively influence those over whom they have no directive authority or control. Additionally, it will need forces that are postured to operate at any point on the spectrum of conflict, organizations, and leaders who can foster long-term relationships in areas of likely conflict, and enhanced civil affairs capabilities.

d. Finally, the Army should implement doctrinal changes that enhance the ability of Army commanders to foster joint, interagency, and multinational (JIM) unity of effort.

Chapter 3
Character of Persistent Conflict

“Perhaps our questions about the environment are a bit like inquiring after the temperament and gait of a horseless carriage.” – adapted from a quote by K. Eric Drexler

3-1. Overview

The initial study approach included an effort to determine the nature of what was termed “this Long War.” As the study participants explored the nature and scope of the problem set characterized by that term, especially as they contemplated how it and the broader strategic environment might evolve in the future, they sensed that the Long War is the current
manifestation of a broader phenomenon. What emerged from this line of exploration was a characterization of the current and future strategic environment dominated by persistent conflict.

a. The strategic environment is significantly different from that which existed during the cold war. Some would argue that the true beginnings of this environment emerged with the development of nuclear weapons and our ability to destroy ourselves. Due to this vast magnification of destructive power, the nation states in possession of this massive power were deterred from using it by the fear of mutually assured destruction. To prevent unlimited escalation, countries sought some amount of international or regional control through agreements and oversight agencies (for example, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the International Atomic Energy Agency) in addition to self-imposed limitations.

b. What has changed in the current environment is the realization that non-state entities, primarily, do not feel restrained from employing violence just because they do not have the clout of nuclear weapons. Also, they feel they are not limited by international organizations or agreements, since they were not party to them. They feel free – and indeed, from their perspective, obligated – to defend themselves from the perceived onslaught of Western interference, unrestrained by threats or agreements developed or offered by existing nation-states. These non-state entities will use irregular warfare, along with catastrophic, disruptive, or even traditional means in a non-traditional manner, all of which can be employed in support of terrorism. Simultaneously, tremendous strides in open-source technologies and the amount of formerly restricted information now available to groups and individuals (tied directly to the ability to communicate that knowledge to whoever desires it) has meant that non-state actors, small groups, and individuals have become increasingly empowered, for good or bad. This has provided ever smaller groups with the means to achieve ever more strategic ends, having extensive, sometimes crippling, impact on the economies and lifestyles of major powers through the expenditure of very limited, yet deadly effort.

c. This combination of circumstances defines the new environment. There exist today different levels of competition, confrontation, and these evolve and occasionally grow into armed conflict. The difference today is that there is no immediate resolution in sight, because those capable of forcing a resolution are limited from doing so either through cultural or political restraints, and their opponents are not capable of forcing a resolution in the traditional military sense, because of their relatively small size and/or lack of regional or strategic political influence. Therefore conflict is persistent, and we find ourselves in an environment that is characterized by persistent conflict.

3-2. Describing Persistent Conflict

a. Descriptions of persistent conflict depict an enduring environment of escalating local and regional conflicts; fueled by globalization, diminishing or poorly distributed resources, and shifting demographics. These conflicts are carried out by local, non-traditional actors, often supported by our strategic adversaries, advocating extremist ideologies and employing a variety of physical and psychological means. The numerous resulting crises will often demand external intervention. Intervention by nation states or coalitions is accepted, and in fact, welcomed by these non-traditional actors because, over time, they serve to exhaust the intervening parties.
strategically, allowing the non-traditional actors to attain greater respect and influence in the eyes of their target audiences and/or constituencies.

b. While there was no broadly accepted delineation of the problem set included “in this Long War,” descriptions of the future strategic environment have emerged, not only in the UQ 2007 series of events, but in contemporary military and political writings as well. It has been characterized as being comprised of a generational struggle of competing ideas and or interests, involving individuals, non-state, and state actors. These actors seek to use emerging technological, economic, and political programs to enable them to employ irregular warfare supported by – singly or in combination – catastrophic, traditional, or disruptive means to achieve self-serving interests that challenge international and U.S. interests. These challenges will require that the U.S. and international communities attain an understanding of the systemic nature of complex adaptive problems that are singular in nature with respect to time, space, ideologies, culture, and language and that require enduring national strategies to bring about successful resolution.

c. The remainder of this chapter discusses the trends and drivers prevalent in this new environment of persistent conflict. It also reinforces the idea, stated earlier, that this conflict is one based on ideas. As the examination of the ideas in conflict continues, this chapter introduces several useful terms that properly frame some of the opponents described above.

3-3. Characteristics
The following characteristics provide some background and supporting arguments as to why persistent conflict can be expected in the foreseeable future, and they give a sense of the characteristics it will display. These characteristics obtained and presented to the participants of UQ 2007 activities by experts in strategic intelligence and political affairs, are neither positive nor negative, but are complex issues in their own right. As each one is studied in depth, a better understanding of the root causes of persistent conflict will emerge. This is simply an introduction and the list below is not meant to be final or exhaustive, but it should evolve as the conflict evolves.

a. Growth in Science and Technology. The exponential growth of science and technology is perhaps the most significant of all trends and drivers. There will be such dramatic, rapid changes in every aspect of science and life in general that they can scarcely be understood before they occur. Driven especially by information technology and communications, the info-, nano-, bio- revolutions will change the world in so many ways that we scarcely understand today. This growth will empower us potentially to improve and/or worsen life vastly on a global basis. There is evidence that the exponential nature of development of integrated circuits as described by Moore’s Law, applies to all fields of science and technology. The future will be dramatically different than today, and information flow will continue to drive science and technology developments.

b. Rising Globalization. Vast increases in information and communication among people groups is the leading driver of globalization. Non-State actors, porous boundaries, and

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5 In fact, many participants asserted that using the word “war” would only bolster an adversary’s narrative, and that the U.S. should drop “this Long War” from the strategic discourse.
knowledge-based economies are leading to declining state influence and a commensurate rise in empowerment of smaller groups and individuals. In addition, the growing linkages among nation-states have limited their willingness to engage in open, major warfare with one another, a limitation non-state actors do not share.

c. **Extremism and the Nature of Warfare.** Our opponents will be demographically rich, technology enabled, and unencumbered by the bureaucratic decisionmaking nature of democratic nation-states. They will be networked, yet cellular and distinct, so that they will have essentially no tangible center of gravity. They will only have a limited unifying ideology, other than a desire for action against us and against local governance in order to further their objectives. Adding to this complexity is the understanding that nation states remain as significant influential factors in the future as well. Unlike most Western nation states, however, our enemies see no limit on their actions (ways) to achieve their ends.

d. **Crime and Terror.** The synergy of crime and terror has provided terrorists with a funding stream that is large, effective, and inherently less detectable than legitimate methods. There is a tendency toward mutual reinforcement of the needs of criminals and terrorists that adds to the capabilities they lack separately. Perhaps most importantly, the networks they develop will be central to their ability to execute their operations.

e. **Violence.** There is an aspect of violence that will drive U.S. military involvement. To the extent that violence is at a *tolerable* level, local security forces will be able to control, or at least be responsible for controlling it. If violence continues to grow, at some point local security forces may no longer be able to control the situation and if that violence affects the national security interests of the U.S., then it may choose to become more involved, presumably in a more military sense. The goal of the U.S. as a Nation is to hold violence to some appropriately low level, realizing the causes of violence can sometimes be justified. The U.S. seeks stability, not stasis. Enemy attacks recently appear to be moving from more symbolic targets to targets of infrastructure. These new targets are highly vulnerable and when attacks on them are successful, they have a huge impact on the Western economies.

f. **WMD and WME Proliferation.** The potential proliferation of WMD and WME can provide strategically destructive capability to our enemies on a massive scale. Acquisition of such capabilities would give our enemies state-like capabilities while not being susceptible to accepted means of detection, deterrence, or defense.

g. **Failing and Failed States: Ungoverned Areas.** Nation states that have failed, or are in the process of failing, can provide a ripe environment for our opponents to use to their advantage and grow, less encumbered by controls that a fully functioning state would provide. Lack of governance or poor governance at all levels has a deleterious impact on the population.

h. **Empowered Groups and Individuals.** Globalization and increased access to information have empowered groups and individuals existing inherently below the nation-state level. These increasingly empowered people and groups will have effects far beyond what such groups could have in the recent past. Consider, for example, Hezbollah’s gaining of popularity by providing traditional state-like services in under-governed areas of southern Lebanon.
i. **Energy Resources.** Increased global demand for energy causes economic stresses and focuses international attention on energy producing areas. As competition for resources drive energy prices, and profits for some, to rise, there has been a tendency for supplier nations to develop a single resource economy. This inherently has led to problems with wealth distribution, employment, and even responsible government. The perceived inequity in distribution of energy resources in the world relative to needs has also contributed to the focus of interest in those areas. Thus, intense competition for these energy resources helps drive persistent conflict.

j. **Climate Change.** Changes in the climate will alter how and where people interact with their environment. Without addressing the cause of climate change, it clearly occurs to varying degrees all the time. It may affect which crops that are grown in a particular region and could increase competition for increasingly scarce resources such as food, water, or arable land, along with everything attendant to those things, such as employment. These changes add stresses among regions and will likely cause some elements to resort to force to maintain their economies and life-styles. These changes also tend to drive migration of populations and are interrelated with many other drivers of persistent conflict.

ek. **Shifting Demographics.** In the broadest sense, the developed world is aging and the developing world is getting younger. The developed world tends to have more economic advantages than the developing world and has become a destination for those seeking better lives and opportunities. This has led to social dislocation and a commensurate desire to connect with peoples’ places of origin, sometimes generations after leaving. This situation is amplified negatively when the gaining nation states fail to develop programs encouraging full assimilation into the new national cultures.

l. **Urbanization.** Closely connected with shifting demographics, urbanization continues to accelerate. This has strained social systems and in some cases led to doubts about the capacities of responsible governments to maintain stability in the face of sustained growth and/or decline. Also, as urbanization increases the significance of military and law enforcement in the face of those same situations.

m. **Economic Limitations.** The U.S. remains the world’s most powerful economy and is projected to remain so past 2050. However, the rise of China and India, in particular, indicates that they are rapidly closing the economic gap. While the U.S. has the largest economy, there are major limitations to its ability to affect the world in ways that the U.S. government may want to direct – as opposed to free market-based evolution. Problems in the world are legion and the ability or desire of the U.S. to spend its capital to address them all is clearly limited. The U.S. must operate with a sense of priority that provides maximum effect for minimum expenditure of resources.

3-4. **Conflict of Ideas**

a. **Values of Modern Civilization.** The U.S. and the West consider representative government as the *sine qua non* of modern civilization. From this *consent of the governed* – whoever and wherever they may be – Western governments derive order, justice, freedom, economic opportunity, and the fruits of the labors of their citizens. As Western civilization has
become more successful, its societies have sought to expand into areas beyond their national boundaries. The world has become more global in many regards, and this success, – culturally, economically and militarily – has been perceived as intrusive and even oppressive by some.

b. **The Opposition.** The most visible current opposition faced by the West is that of non-state violent extremist organizations exploiting misunderstandings and perversions of religion. There are many supporters of their efforts beyond those committed to that ideology – notably, adversarial nation states. Perhaps the most supportive are criminals seeking to profit from the lack of governance that results from persistent or chronic conflict. This synergistic relationship between *terrorists* and *criminals* empowered by globalization, even as they argue against it, has given them a means to compete with, and in some cases, *defeat* nation states; defeat, in these cases, may involve simply surviving to cause trouble another day.

(1) Some mischaracterize the militant Islamic opposition to the West as *jihad*. This opposition is most correctly described as conducting *Hirabah* – un-just war against society. This term is important and should be part of the lexicon to put the enemy in the appropriate frame of reference. These *Mufsidoon* – condemned evildoers – are an aberration in Islam and to the extent that Muslims are convinced this is so, the more they will seek to limit their influence within Islam and the rest of the world, perhaps even to the point of actively opposing them.

(2) The opponents of the West will make significant use of deception and denial – including blending into the civilian population. They will also use sophisticated propaganda and global media to achieve their ends.

(3) It is likely that over time the nature of the opponents of the West will change. They may shift to more non-Islamic groups, but their open-networked nature will probably remain a hallmark of how they function. These non-state actors, as stated above, have become more empowered and can be expected to continue to grow more so. Cultural and military commentators must avoid overstating the strength of these opponents, as this can provide more advantages to the opposition than what is garnered by the West. Truth and conviction in stating Western values are critical to success, both internally and as an example to the world. While U.S. and Western focus is more on non-state actors, state-on-state conflict remains a possibility in this new environment. Periodically, the low-level persistent conflict will flare up into medium-scale or large-scale warfare conducted by states. This may challenge how the U.S. and its partners prepare and allocate forces in the longer term.

c. **The Rest: Those That Really Matter.** The focus of effort in the persistent conflict environment must not be the opponents, but rather the people, the *human terrain* in which they operate. It is interests of the general population, those who might indirectly or directly agree with but not necessarily act in support of the opponents, which must be addressed. They must be convinced of the correctness of Western values and ideas and influenced to support the development of their capacity to combat the mutual opponents and their ideas.
3-5. Conclusion
The future strategic environment will be characterized by confrontations that grow into conflict that are difficult to resolve and therefore persistent in nature. The trends and drivers discussed above will influence the nature of this persistent conflict. While conflict may be persistent in general, it does not mean that there is one conflict or that the conflicts that occur are caused by the same drivers. On the contrary, causes of conflicts will be extremely diverse and different elements will likely be in conflict among themselves coordinating only when their interests coincide. Dealing with persistent conflict will require a complex, robust, and appropriate set of strategic considerations to frame the approaches to this new set of challenges. This publication addresses these strategic considerations in the next chapter.

Chapter 4
Strategic Considerations for a NMS

4-1. Introduction
To limit the UQ 2007 examination to a manageable level, senior leadership identified three strategies that represented the broad range of possibilities for dealing with emerging threats and trends. First, they examined a notional strategy that was most challenging for the U.S. military, calling it Transformational Democracy. Next, they examined a strategy of Stabilization. Finally, they examined a policy of Strategic Retrenchment that accepted a degree of instability and less continual U.S. involvement in order to maintain more strategic maneuverability when needed.

4-2. Range of U.S. Foreign Policy Strategies
Over the history of the U.S., there have been a wide variety of foreign policies, or more security-focused national security strategies. These have evolved over time and circumstance and the interests of the U.S. have expanded with its growth as a nation. In order that the military meets the objectives set out in the NSS, DOD develops a NMS. That NMS obviously must support the larger NSS, but the NSS will change over time, with new administrations, etc. For proper understanding, one should first understand the range of possible strategies that the nation may pursue, and then ensure the ability to pursue a military strategy that supports policy within that range.
a. **Transformational Democracy.** This strategy pursues an overarching goal to transform the world into a set of democratic nations. This would be most challenging to the military and national policy, since it implies active involvement in maintaining democracies where they are threatened and supporting their development where they do not yet exist. As the military would need to expand its capabilities, so would the other elements of national power. This policy would be very demanding and probably meet with strong resistance from many of those the U.S. would seek to help.

b. **Stabilization.** This policy seeks an international environment that promotes fundamental human rights, effective governance, prosperity, stability, and institutionalized security. It would build legitimacy and capacity of key states, rather than the entire world, in order to reduce the susceptibility of their populations to extremist ideologies. It would also identify individual countries and sub-regions at risk from extremism, cooperatively identify and build teams, develop tailored strategies for each, and build coalitions to implement the strategy.

c. **Strategic Retrenchment.** In this policy the U.S. would accept a degree of instability in the world while maintaining more limited relationships to regain strategic maneuverability that has been lost through over commitment of resources. Strategic resources would be redeployed to locations commensurate with securing core interests. Intervention would be conducted for deterrent and punitive effects rather than transformational objectives.

### 4-3. Military Implications

U.S. NMS must support, and the military must have the capabilities and capacity to pursue successfully, the NSS as it changes over time. It is also clear that stability at some level is desirable for the U.S. in order to pursue its national interests. As more instability arises there is likely a greater effect on national interests. The U.S. seeks to have partners that can help maintain that stability and seeks to enhance or build the capacity of partners to meet their challenges. If the instability or violence grows to a level that more directly involves national interests, it becomes more likely the U.S. will become directly involved. As the U.S. becomes
more involved it will want to do so in the most effective and efficient way possible. Given the characteristics of the environment of persistent conflict now and in the future, there are three critical implications for the military in its support of the NSS: the establishment and continued enforcement of persistent security; the need to have the capabilities to conduct operations that can truly be characterized as *full spectrum*; and helping others to help themselves through a managed program of BPC.

a. **Persistent Security.** Just as UQ 2007 events identified persistent conflict as a condition of the current and future environment, participants identified a need for persistent security as a necessary condition under which to achieve national security objectives. Persistent security, defined and described more fully in chapter 6 of this publication, encourages effective governance while preventing more crises from getting out of hand. Just as diplomatic, information, and economic, as well as military, elements of national power provide the U.S. with its own security, all the elements of national power are critical to supporting a condition of persistent security in the rest of the world. Part of the UQ 2007 analysis showed that earlier rather than later involvement is more effective in military responses to crises. Thus persistent security is a useful condition to pursue. It implies an *anticipatory* element that will limit the growth of violence that threatens the interests of the U.S. It is a *positive* goal, and it is less intrusive than promoting a particular political program that may help solve the conflict, but would likely be challenged as inappropriate interference by opponents as well as many friends. This implies that it is in the interests of the U.S. to ensure its partners have the ability to control violence promoted and conducted by mutual enemies. Therefore, U.S. policy may need to address building or enhancing its partners’ capabilities to allow unhindered conduct of FSO.

b. **FSO.** The term FSO implies the ability to conduct any type of military operation with the full coordination of all the elements of national power, both domestic and those of international partners. As the cold war recedes into history, irregular warfare has become the primary method used by enemies of the U.S. The absence of clearly-defined peer-competitors and the nature of conflict in the near future imply that forces formerly designed for general war may be called upon to conduct smaller-scale, lower-intensity operations, while maintaining their edge in traditional interstate warfare. The ability of the U.S. to be effective in these other forms of conflict can be reinforced through the building or enhancing the capacity of our partnerships with other elements of the U.S. Government as well as those with other nation-states and international partners.

c. **BPC.** In order to pursue national security goals optimally, the U.S. must rely on its partners around the globe. These partners may be nations or non-state actors within nation states – even unfriendly nation states. These partners will have a depth of perspective and understanding lacking in the U.S. They are the ones best equipped and able to solve their own problems. The U.S. should engage with them to enhance their capacity and in those cases where problems grow beyond their ability to address, judge how best to support them with U.S. and coalition partners’ capacities. BPC is a direct and mutually beneficial strategy for those who partner with the U.S. and serves as an effective means to establish persistent security.
4-4. Conclusion
The Army and all services must be capable of supporting the U.S. NSS. That strategy will evolve over time, within the framework discussed above. There are three key aspects to ensuring we can support the NSS:

- The ability to provide persistent security in order to promote viable governance.
- The ability to conduct Full-Spectrum Operations to address the full range of future challenges. Today, that means balancing capabilities for irregular warfare with those for general war.
- The ability to assist in BPC so that friends can conduct operations in their own interest will be critical to ensuring U.S. national security goals can be met effectively. Given the nature of the future environment, the U.S. must optimize the use of its resources wisely, while maximizing partners’ capabilities, in order to attain mutual security objectives.

Chapter 5
Future Full Spectrum Operations (FSO)

5-1. General
This chapter addresses the nature of the future operational environment, assumptions and operating principles, and some needed capabilities for future FSO that emerged in discussions leading up to and during the Army’s Annual Title 10 United States Code (USC) Capstone War Game, UNIFIED QUEST 2007. It develops a future context and goes on to describe future FSO in terms of a concept of operations (CONOPS) that may be used as a template or a type operational layout for designing a campaign for a GCC.

5-2. The Future
While future conflicts cannot be described with exact accuracy, there are some aspects of future conflict that can be assumed reasonably. With no peer competitor envisioned for at least a decade, as indicated in previous chapters, adversaries are expected to pursue irregular warfare tactics to counter U.S. conventional power, employing a strategy of exhaustion rather than annihilation, along with sophisticated information operations (IO) to win the battle of ideas. With the U.S. military becoming more CONUS-based, and therefore expeditionary in nature, DOD expects the Army to prepare, deploy, fight, and redeploy/reset within the existing constraints of the training and readiness cycles with tailored force packages employed in multiple simultaneous engagements. Since winning the war without ensuring the peace is not the optimal way to operate, stability operations will be the key to securing operational objectives in most instances.

5-3. The American Tradition
The idealized American tradition of conflict can be characterized as one of short decisive wars against nation states and opposing alliances of nation states. When necessary, the U.S. historically generated additional force structure from its citizenry to mobilize against threats to the U.S. way of life, and that of its allies and coalition partners. The emphasis was almost always on conventional operations, firepower, and destruction. When it came to stability operations, the U.S. prosecuted them, but they were not a priority. With the move into the
twenty-first century, the need for general purpose forces, as well as SOF, to become more involved with stability operations has become more pronounced. Additionally, while not the preferred way to address the current need for military capabilities, the expansion of conflicts around the world, especially in the Middle East still requires a significant proportion of mobilized citizenry, in the form of reserve component units in the rotation mix of forces for the foreseeable future.

5-4. Problem Statement
The U.S. and its coalition partners must be prepared to defeat an enemy who routinely employs irregular warfare as part of a strategy of to extend the conflict in order to erode U.S. national will, without losing the capability to conduct full-scale mid- to high-intensity military operations against a peer competitor.

5-5. Basic Design Considerations

a. The future enemies of the U.S. and its coalition partners will probably design their operations to avoid Western strengths and exploit vulnerabilities by avoiding conventional battle. They are expected to pursue a strategy of exhaustion through protracted war, supported and enabled by sophisticated IO. In order to address this, the U.S. must adapt so that it is able to address and combat irregular warfare conducted not only by nation-states but by non-state and transnational opponents.

b. Even though differences in the ideas of freedom, economy, international influence, and control dominated the cold war, differences in ideas takes on a much more consequential aspect in the post September 11, 2001 era. All operations will be designed much more in a way to balance activities within the cognitive as well as the physical realm in order to undermine enemy ideological and political credibility and win support both from neutrals and the uncommitted. While operational level planning will continue to be conducted in much the same way as in the cold war era, the ideas associated with operational design as part of a comprehensive operational-level joint concept for the conduct of an extensive campaign will take on much more emphasis and importance. Additionally, U.S. and coalition military services can expect to see adoption of protracted offensive irregular and UW aspects in order to expand friendly options to defeat modern enemies.

5-6. General Considerations for Future FSO
Commanders must realize they will execute fights simultaneously in the cognitive and physical realm in the conflict of ideas. Additionally, enemies will probably avoid pitched battle; using well-trained fighters equipped with high- and low-tech weaponry to attrite U.S. forces; using deception and denial – including blending into the civilian population; with emphasis on sophisticated propaganda and the presence of global media; and adopting a campaign strategy similar to those employed by Hezbollah in Lebanon (2006), Iran (today), and Japan (post 1943), that is, tactically/operationally defensive. Regardless of the demands of a regional conflict, the Army must sustain a global effort, but realizing that U.S. force structure will continue to be constrained.
5-7. Operational Principles

   a. The U.S. must have the steadfast will to conduct protracted warfare to erode the enemy’s will and means to fight. In conjunction with the combat operations, the U.S. must integrate influence operations to counter the enemy’s cultural narrative, ensuring that friendly *actions* match the friendly *message*. Through this integrated approach to conflict the U.S. will be able to undermine enemy ideological and political legitimacy and credibility, win and maintain support from neutrals, sustain coalition unity, and successfully address the global audience.

   b. Military land components should be organized into *securing* and *stabilizing* forces and secure defendable areas progressively. In those areas outside of the direct conventional fighting, they must strive to achieve persistent security in order to conduct successful stability operations. Stability operations are the ultimate means to secure the military victory and allow for timely withdrawal of U.S. and coalition forces after the hostilities.

5-8. FSO in the Future Context

The future FSO design will be an operational-level, whole of government concept for conducting a protracted campaign set in the period 2010-2025. Designed to integrate the optimal set of strategic capabilities, the concept will address a wide range of requirements. U.S. forces need a creative mix of: conventional, general purpose forces; SOF; coalition partners and surrogates; and interagency and corporate partners and others.

5-9. Specific Factors Affecting the U.S. and its Coalition Partners

   a. **Persistent Conflict.** The U.S. must gain and maintain public support over the long haul; the public must understand and support the break with American tradition (short and decisive wars).

   b. **Cultural Understanding.** Cultural understanding is important in order to understand the root causes of conflict; appreciate nuances of tribal, ethnic, religious, political, social and economic divides that exist in the battle space; develop effective influence and informational programs or campaigns; detect and understand adversaries; and comprehend how the enemy fights and makes his decisions.

   c. **Human Intelligence.** This is essential for detecting an enemy embedded in the populace or driven underground by U.S. technology.

   d. **Information Operations.** Integration of influence operations from strategic communications to tactical PSYOP is imperative since irregular warfare is largely fought in the cognitive realm. The U.S. must also perform carefully selected actions that send the correct message, in order to support the narrative depicting the overall purpose and character of the conflict. The principle here is *unity of action and message*.

   e. **Partnerships.** The U.S. must build solid coalitions and build and sustain alliances based on shared interests and values (ideals).
f. **Unified Action.** Military action requires interagency participation, but U.S. interagency partners traditionally are neither chartered, resourced, nor trained for an expeditionary role.

g. **Operational Command.** Joint task forces (JTF) should be based on a flexible mix of existing modular units (professionally led, manned, trained, equipped, and organized), instead of ad hoc constructs.

h. **Civil Military Operations.** Civil military operations and interagency coordination at all levels within the area of operations (AO) play critical roles in successful counter-insurgency and stability operations.

i. **Common User Logistics.** This requires a joint integrated acquisition, requisition, management, and distribution system, as well as a system of in-transit visibility.

j. **Measures of Success.** State measures of success succinctly and clearly, especially in light of irregular conflicts, with supportive information programs to sustain coalition, domestic, and international support. Also, they must be accurate, measurable, and useful, or else they will waste time and effort by the inability to identify and agree upon them.

5-10. **Sample Scenario for Future FSO**
Appendix B to this publication depicts a comprehensive sample scenario of future FSO. It illustrates a notional theater operational environment requiring long term shaping operations as well as decisive conventional and stability operations. Also shown are types of joint and interagency entities that might serve the GCC in various phases of the operation. It should be noted that the operational phases and activities depicted in this sample scenario do not necessarily correspond with the standard phases called for in current joint operating or integrating concepts.

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**Chapter 6**  
**Persistent Security**

6-1. **General**
This chapter describes the concept of persistent security as it emerged from insights gained in the future warfare study and during events held as part of the Army’s Annual Title 10 United States Code (USC) Capstone War Game, UNIFIED QUEST 2007. Several themes emerged during UQ 2007, but the theme of persistent security is one of only a few that figured consistently and prominently at UQ 2007 events throughout the year. An earlier chapter laid out the ubiquitous conditions which indicate that we are in an era characterized by persistent conflict. This situation suggests that there is a need for a countervailing concept employing FSO forces and capabilities in order to yield a condition of persistent security. In fact, some degree of persistent security is essential in order to carry out the concept of BPC.
6-2. Defining Persistent Security
Persistent security is defined as an enduring condition or state facilitated or provided by military forces that allows for the development and further application of a nation’s elements of national power in ways that enable a stable and lasting peace.

6-3. Military Role

a. There is a shared understanding across U.S. interagency partners of the need, given the current strategic environment, for the employment of military forces to set conditions for persistent security. The military role in enabling persistent security requires varying degrees of commitment. The public must recognize persistent security as an essential condition in order to sustain commitments across the full spectrum of military operations. Persistent security in this context could range from simple observation and assistance all the way up to full-scale employment of general purpose forces. The military, then, evaluates its ability to contribute during the analysis of political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information conditions required in the operational design efforts of campaign planning; then contributes to the diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic elements of national power in the execution of the campaign.

b. Military contributions in support of persistent security may require implementation in either combat or non-combat environments. In a combat environment, the military can contribute locally via sensors, boots on the ground, and precision fires where needed; regionally via increased intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance fusion and speed of decision/action; and globally via speed of deployment, greater access, and the ability to fight upon arrival. In a non-combat environment, the military’s contributions can be applied locally with boots on the ground providing goods, services, and security where needed; regionally with rapidly deployable organizations and systems to help manage a myriad of entities – for example, infrastructure, governance, and essential services; and globally via speed of services, greater access, and action upon arrival.
c. Understanding the culture and environment is a crucial element of land power dominance which contributes immensely to persistent security aspects in all phases of every campaign.

6-4. Interagency Roles

a. The level of security is critical in the determination of employment of the capabilities of those elements of national power other than the military. The less stable or less secure the environment, the larger the military’s role. As the situation becomes more stable, other instruments of national power should increase their respective presence and begin exercising their roles. The challenge will be to create and sustain a stable and secure environment sufficient to allow the interagency elements to operate in a reasonably permissive environment. The relative degrees of stability and security will also determine the nature of the roles the military and interagency elements will serve. The methods of each in attaining the campaign objectives in these various environments will determine whether each element is supported versus supporting, and establish the direct correlation of applying these methods toward increasing and/or maintaining stability and security levels.

b. Enabling persistent security requires a concept for implementation that is adaptable to local requirements, while consistent with overall campaign objectives and nested within the national strategy. Therefore, the concept for implementation must take on a bottom-up approach consistent with the overall concept of campaign operations; it must be well planned long before the initiation of overt hostilities; and it must be carried out concurrently with on-going FSO, rather than as an afterthought or a follow-on phase. This concept of implementation could have a significant impact on the doctrinally-supported traditional phased approach to campaign planning and execution, as detailed in the following paragraphs.

Figure 6-2: Elements of National Power in Various Security Environments
6-5. Concept for Enabling Persistent Security

a. **Bottom-Up.** Establishing normalcy in the form of local governance begins down at the street and neighborhood level. While the overall theme of this local governance is generally stated within the strategic objectives for the nation state or the region, and stated as clearly as possible within the cultural narrative, it is implemented one small area at a time, building and linking secure and functioning areas, thus enabling BPC operations throughout. In this way, once legitimate national governance is in place, the national mechanisms will more readily be able to establish and carry out policy with secure and stable lower level governmental organs already in place and functioning well.

b. **Thought Out Beforehand.** Establishing persistent security carries too high of a priority to be determined after all the dust settles from major combat operations. It requires a deliberate effort as part of the campaign design and plan well before open hostilities begin.

c. **Concurrent Operations.** Persistent security must be part of all combat operations, even if only to a small degree. The commander cannot afford to wait until all combat operations are complete within the country or region before implementing persistent security operations. Such an approach would put BPC operations too far behind, and contribute to longer periods of instability, thus continuing to put U.S. and coalition military forces, as well as interagency elements and the indigenous population, at greater risk. As an example, concurrent operations could take the form of a major combat force clearing a zone of enemy conventional and unconventional forces followed by another major force with the mission to conduct stability operations as the first force moves to a new zone. This indirectly challenges the idea of the general phase delineations of the campaign applying throughout the area of responsibility (AOR), but reinforces the ideas of full spectrum operations forces conducting concurrent offense, defense, and stability operations as described in current operating concepts and doctrine.

6-6. Potential Means for Persistent Security

Once all of the functional requirements for establishing persistent security have been determined, it falls to the GCC to evaluate various organizational constructs for implementing them.

a. **Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF).** The JIATF is an example of a multiagency, interdisciplinary approach that uses various elements of national power to accomplish an objective. Unlike some of the options below, the JIATF is not ad hoc, it is chartered with specific guidelines, allocated manpower, and a budget. In order for a JIATF to be successful in achieving the operational or strategic goals there must be cooperation and coordination among all of its participating agencies. A JIATF can improve cooperation at the operational level by enhancing trust and understanding among federal agencies. The JIATF serves to coordinate all USG activities involved in implementing BPC operations, beginning with the oversight of persistent security within the AOR.

b. **TMAAG-F.** TMAAG-F is a notional construct introduced during UQ 2007 and currently under examination in the concept development and experimentation arena. The TMAAG-F is envisioned as an adjunct of the Army service component commander (ASCC) for a theater, providing advisory, assessment, and assistance teams to specific countries within the area of responsibility (AOR).
AOR in coordination with the efforts of the country teams. TMAAG-F would ensure the availability and readiness of all military Service assets required to support steady state security assistance, land force dominance, and BPC activities by drawing on a clearly identified pool of designated military units and individuals from existing force providers.

c. Security Assistance Organizations (SAO). There are SAO charters for each country they are supporting, and primarily focus on foreign internal defense (FID), assistance with foreign military sales, and other military-related internal defense and development (IDAD) activities. These typically employ a variety of forward-based SOF. Examples include the U.S. Military Advisory Group in El Salvador, and the Office of Defense Cooperation in Romania.

d. Country Teams. These interagency teams work in their assigned countries at the direction of the chief of mission for their assigned country. As directed and allowed within specific bilateral agreements, they coordinate and direct nation building, BPC, and IDAD activities.

e. U.S. Government/Nongovernmental Organizations. The USG and nongovernmental organizations would enable persistent security in a more stable environment where the military element of national power does not provide the majority of effort. These entities would more than likely serve in a country where stability and security are beginning to deteriorate, but have not done so to the extent necessary for major military involvement. They would also serve more as either policy level or policy recommending organs.

6-7. Conclusions and Way Ahead

a. The level of persistent security in a given country or region will dictate the degree of participation of USG elements other than the military in BPC operations. Participation of USG elements is crucial; thus commanders must plan for and establish persistent security as early as possible if they are to bring in USG elements and be successful in establishing local governance quickly and enduring persistent security over the long haul.

b. Planning for persistent security must ensure a bottom-up approach, conceptualized and incorporated early on in the campaign planning process, to ensure implementation concurrently with other military operations.

c. Oversight and leadership are crucial to the success of persistent security operations, and for the success of ongoing efforts for BPC.

Chapter 7
Future Theater Military Advisory and Assistance Group

7-1. General
As noted in the concluding SLS of UQ 2007, the Army leadership recognizes two critical aspects of the current nature and expected nature of global engagement: (1) the Army is losing the capabilities within general purpose forces for BPC within friendly nations; and (2) the military
needs to maintain a critical degree of continued engagement as it redeployes forces strategically to bases either within or closer to CONUS. Thus, the GCCs require flexible, scalable, tailorable forces and cadres of theater specialists with language, cultural, social, operational, and historical acumen that can be tapped for continued peacetime engagement, capacity-building, and for planning and execution of deliberate operations in the time of crisis. These organizations would serve to establish, engage in, reinforce, and ensure actions focused on persistent security and BPC.

7-2. Basic Description
The TMAAG-F, a notional element envisioned to be organized under the ASCC, could add the capabilities indicated above to the GCC. The TMAAG-F would coordinate the availability and readiness of all military service assets required to support these missions with the force providers.

a. Current organizations involved in peacetime engagement are limited in their abilities to provide support to persistent security operations and BPC. SAO are primarily involved with support for foreign military sales and other military-related IDAD activities. PSYOP organizations have peacetime engagement responsibilities and conducts peacetime PSYOP and information programs that support the GCCs’ Theater Security Cooperation Plans. Country teams, under their respective chiefs of mission, coordinate and direct nation-building, BPC, and IDAD activities, but are constrained by legislative limitations on size and degree of freedom to act. In some cases, the military makes ad hoc arrangements in order to perform appropriate engagement (for example, small teams consisting of reconfigured general purpose forces from the 1st Infantry Division currently train the Iraqi army and the Afghan national army in the form of small military training teams and embedded training teams).

b. As noted in recent and ongoing conflicts, two critical elements of FSO involve ensuring persistent security and BPC in otherwise ungoverned areas in order to assist friendly nation states in developing and maintaining a stable, peaceful environment in which they may prosper economically and politically. This new TMAAG-F organization would assist GCCs in fulfilling these and other peacetime engagement requirements.

7-3. Capabilities Coordinated by the TMAAG-F
The TMAAG-F gives the GCC flexible, tailorable, scalable organizations that maintain the smallest possible footprint while providing the necessary capabilities within his/her AOR.

a. The employed steady state and surge capabilities could come from operational units (such as special forces, civil affairs, or PSYOPS units; heavy, Stryker, or light modular BCTs or support brigades; or units from the other Services); generating force units (such as enlisted initial entry training, or noncommissioned officer (NCO) or officer training academy units); critical-skill military individuals (like foreign area officers or specialists; individual ready reserve Soldier specialists; or military doctors, nurses, dentists, or veterinarians); or interagency or contract specialists (like foreign service officers, economists, agricultural specialists, law enforcement specialists, telecommunications or information technology specialists, firefighters, major construction specialists, or business developers).
b. Personnel involved with the missions inherent to these types of organizations and functions must understand the cultural, historical, political, religious, and language aspects of the diverse societies in which our Soldiers and other service members or citizens will potentially operate.

7-4. Other Considerations
The Army is and will continue to be part of a combined team. With this always in the forefront of operational design and planning, the TMAAG-F must have the necessary capacity to coordinate for other service assets in support of theater and host nation needs as seamlessly and thoroughly as possible.

a. A variety of hypothetical situations may be used in order to examine the role of the TMAAG-F in different GCC AORs and in settings with varying degrees of stability and security. Consider the following three hypothetical examples:

- **Case 1: Nigeria.** Low level of persistent security and continuing insurgency with sporadic episodes that may involve short-duration major combat operations. In this case, hostilities might be such that USG interagency elements might not be secure in conducting their functions, but their expertise (provided through the TMAAG-F) might be needed in order to advise U.S. forces in carrying out those necessary functions as part of civil-military operations and/or civil affairs operations.

- **Case 2: Post-Castro Cuba.** Low level of persistent security with a state experiencing unstable peace, formerly hostile, but now friendly. This might involve creating new security assistance arrangements, as well as other IDAD arrangements where none have existed in the recent past. In this case, TMAAG-F-coordinated units or individuals would work with the new Chief of Mission (ambassador, commissioner, or charge d’affaires) and his/her country team to ensure optimal, noncompetitive functioning.

- **Case 3: Indonesia.** Moderate level of persistent security with a stable and historically friendly state experiencing a period of uneasy stability. This case would model the continuing of existing security assistance and IDAD arrangements, while improving and augmenting them as necessary, without interfering with ongoing functions established by treaty or other bilateral or multilateral agreements. In this case also, TMAAG-F-coordinated units or individuals would work with the chief of mission and his country team to continue optimal, noncompetitive functioning.

b. Implementation of a TMAAG-F concept should take into consideration the following:

- It should promote and enhance cooperation with other agencies involved within existing security assistance arrangements.
- The establishment of such an organization must not have a negative impact on the Army’s ability to generate adequate forces to meet ongoing world-wide force requirements.
- The organization and its functions must not have a negative impact on recruiting, assessment, training, education, development, and management of the careers of Soldiers and leaders with specific skill sets for the future.
c. Appendix C provides the conceptual underpinnings for the TMAAG-F and depicts a variety of candidate structures. It shows a screening of existing Army operational and functional concepts and indicates how current concepts provide sufficient justification for the existence of the TMAAG-F without necessitating new concept development. The various candidate organizational structures in this appendix reflect different approaches to command and control that could apply, depending on the security situation being faced by the country team and the GCC.

Chapter 8
Civil Affairs

8-1. Introduction

a. Another topic of discussion at the SLS during UQ 2007 was the need to rebuild the U.S. Army CA capacity. Recent events substantiate that the Army must be able to govern occupied or ungoverned areas effectively until responsibility is transferred to the appropriate civilian authorities. Since World War II, CA force structure has been reduced in size and scope in the face of changing Army priorities. For example, as shown in figure 8-1, the 21 functional specialty areas doctrinally aligned with CA units in field manual (FM) 41-10 have since been consolidated into the six functional specialty areas currently listed in FM 3-05.40.

b. For the Army to be effective in FSO, it must invest in personnel, organization and training of its CA units in order to assist host nation governments in the functions of local,
regional, and national governance. This will help to gain the support of the civilian population quickly, thus enhancing the GCC’s ability to establish conditions of persistent security while assisting in BPC.

8-2. Future Operating Environment

a. In future operations, the Army must plan for and be prepared to govern on an interim basis when conditions are not favorable for the introduction of other elements of national power. U.S. interagency partners do not currently have the expeditionary capacity to operate alongside military personnel in non-permissive environments. There is also no current plan to build up that capacity accordingly. The establishment of ad hoc organizations is not typically the way the U.S. Army trains and it should not be the way it conducts CA missions in the future operating environment.

b. UQ 2007 insights reinforced the notion that the military must expect to perform many of the same CA tasks it once performed in World War II, without the immediate support of U.S. or coalition interagency partners. During World War II, CA and military government units followed combat units into cities, towns, and villages, and performed basic governance tasks for the local populations. These CA units provided the specialized functional tasks essential for maintaining basic services, infrastructure, and effective governance, all of which are capabilities required today and in the foreseeable future for campaign force protection and persistent security functions.

c. Today, U.S. Army CA units retain the civil administration mission. Current Army doctrine and force structure, however, primarily support modularity and tactical operations without consideration for area support missions within the cities and provincial boundaries where CA capabilities can provide the greatest support to the GCC. Marginalizing, and in some cases abandoning, the area support mission of the CA commands and brigades, significantly hinders the senior military commander’s ability to enhance the relationships between military forces, the civil authorities, and the people where U.S. military forces are operating.

8-3. Specific Recommendations and Implications

a. The Army should conduct a comprehensive examination of current CA capabilities and determine how the Army should accede, train, educate, and develop its CA personnel and grow the CA branch in order to meet the needs of the Army fully in future FSO. Additionally, it should reexamine regulations and policies to streamline the accession of skilled professionals into the active Army and reserve components to ensure that the required specialties are available when the need arises. In past years, the Army allowed for direct commissioning of skilled professionals to a rank commensurate with their specialties and experience levels, which, if implemented today, could significantly strengthen the CA force. As an interim measure, the Army should reestablish policies that allow support branches compatible with CA functional specialties to detail selected personnel to CA assignments without penalty to their careers (for example, transportation, military police, finance).
b. The Army should also conduct a study of the feasibility, acceptability, and effectiveness of regionally aligning Army CA elements to perform civil government functions where indigenous governments are currently not fully capable and/or U.S. interagency partners do not possess adequate expeditionary capabilities to perform those functions. This would apply to peacetime situations and combat operations. Additionally, the Army should fine-tune its current force of CA officers and enlisted specialists to ensure its CONUS-based force can provide rotation and/or reinforcement support structure for its forward-based, steady-state units.

c. If the Army is serious about the quality of knowledge and experience of its CA officers and NCOs, then it must examine closely its program of professional development for the CA career fields to ensure appropriate opportunities for educational and professional growth. Because of the unique skills required in successful CA operations, there should be correspondingly unique alignments of programs for advanced civil schooling and professional growth experience. Thus, the Army should assist in coordinating for master’s degree programs in such disciplines as international relations, public diplomacy, political science, finance, law enforcement, and public safety. As with current training with industry programs available to other military branches, the CA branch could benefit significantly by detailing its officers and NCOs to work with municipal, state, and federal agencies in order to gain hands-on expertise in governance.

8-4. Conclusion

a. Historically, the Army has been involved in conducting and managing the functions of governance since the aftermath of the Mexican War in the late 1840s. Since World War II, the Army has maintained trained CA organizations to conduct civil administrative and/or military governance activities in any region. CA units historically have been the military commander’s force multiplier for matters involving the relationships between military forces, civil authorities, and the people in his area of operational responsibility. The Army must increase its CA capacity in order to establish and continue indigenous governance activities in hostile areas or immature theaters until relieved by U.S. or coalition interagency partners. These functions are crucial in establishing conditions or persistent security and in BPC.

b. Under current law, U.S. interagency partners cannot force their civilian employees to deploy into hazardous areas in order to further U.S. objectives. Therefore, the Army must expand and develop its CA elements in order to meet emerging requirements. Efficient control of the civilian population and mobilization of local civilian resources within an AO reduces the need for military general purpose forces and special purpose forces. The use of viable CA personnel in the early planning stages of an operation, coupled with the use of a proper CA command structure, will in the long run prove an efficient use of resources.
Chapter 9
Campaign Planning

9-1. Background

a. TRADOC’s development of a campaign planning methodology began after the Capstone War Game in 2003, and interest in this subject remains high today, as evidenced by remarks from the SLS in UQ 2007. Insights gleaned from UQ over the past several years – coupled with those from recent campaigns in Mesopotamia and South Central Asia – have led the Army to consider that its doctrinal approach to campaign planning at the operational level requires more focus on how it does operational design and framing of operational problems before initiating formal planning.

b. The UQ 2004 Capstone War Game depicted an invasion of a large fictitious country on seven widely separated axes. Blue forces penetrated deep within the notional country from all directions. The campaign was proceeding successfully until the final turn of the war game, when the game controllers directed the blue force commander to seize the enemy’s capital city. The blue force commander balked at having to seize a city of 12-15 million inhabitants, given the size and condition of his forces. Furthermore, he could see that the enemy was not responding to the invasion as expected. Rather than commit its regular forces in a conventional last ditch effort to preserve the capital city, the red force dissipated and began operating from within the civil population as guerillas. When the blue force commander questioned the order to seize the capital city, the team playing his theater strategic-level higher headquarters was confronted with the fact that they did not fully understand the enemy’s actions or intentions; their strategic directive to seize the capital city was shaped by the paradigm of conventional war rather than an assessment of the capital city’s actual military value.

c. The result of this war game inspired further study of the need for more rigorous approach to understanding in campaign design. Shortly thereafter, the ARCIC FWD began examining systemic operational design (SOD). SOD offers a methodology for a comprehensive understanding of complex operational problems, and for designing a broad problem-solving approach based on this understanding.

d. In contrast, American and Soviet operational planners traditionally perceive operational art in a much different context. Both typically address conventional contests between regular armies rather than the complexity of irregular warfare. SOD assumes that all forms of warfare are available. It also assumes that political and/or strategic guidance will be incomplete at best and lacking in sufficient specificity at worst. Thus, it is the writ of the commander at the operational level of war to build a shared understanding of a problem with his strategic-level superiors through a somewhat formalized and candid mutual discourse. The tenets of SOD encourage – and even demand – this type of interaction.

9-2. Understanding Complex Operational Problems
Despite the fact that SOD has not been fully tested in war, its examination in UQ 2005 and UQ 2006 suggested that it would be of tremendous value, particularly in the context of irregular
The central proposition of SOD is that commanders at the operational level of war must understand the operational problems they are charged to solve before beginning to visualize solutions. Today’s operational environment is different from and more complex than that of the cold war in Central Europe where commanders understood their enemy and the operational problems they faced, and their strategic guidance was thorough and carefully articulated. In situations where the adversaries, friendly forces, and wider operational environment are complex and have unique dynamics, commanders must devote time up front and throughout the campaign to understand the operational problem. This understanding and learning takes on greater importance in the context of enduring campaigns and complex operational problems.

a. A few years ago, expeditionary was a term often used to describe transformational units like the Stryker brigade combat teams. The term signified, then and now, the ability to project forces rapidly across the globe. This capability has tremendous value for a force based in the continental U.S. Nevertheless, expeditionary is an incomplete description for the Army’s general purpose forces. As defined in Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, an expedition is a military operation conducted by an armed force to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country – is understood to be of short duration. It accomplishes a specific objective which is likely to be carefully defined and discrete, such as the conduct of a noncombatant evacuation operation. The complete description for an Army capable of conducting FSO is a campaign quality, expeditionary Army.

b. As defined in JP a campaign is a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. That it consists of a series of operations and expects to accomplish a strategic or operational objective, whose scale and complexity defy rapid conclusion means that a campaigning force must be able to operate over an extended period of time. For this reason, JP 3-0 added perseverance as one of the principles of joint operations.

c. Therefore, a campaigning force must select its daily activities, engagements, and major operations in accordance with an overarching campaign design. Otherwise, the sum of these operations will not achieve the campaign’s operational and strategic objective. Some operations may make short-term sense but do long-term harm. Therefore, each operation must be guided by an operational design that is unique to the campaign that it is supporting. The prerequisite for a campaign’s operational design to be effective is a comprehensive understanding of the operational problems the command must solve.

d. The complexity of future conflicts also requires an emphasis on understanding. Today and in the future, the nature of operational problems will be more complex than those in the First and Second World Wars and in Central Europe during the cold war. Each of these was or was expected to be a total war? fought conventionally by regular armies. Current and future
operations are more likely to face a combination of traditional and irregular threats, all designed to establish, extend, or undermine the legitimacy of a government. (See theIrregular Warfare Joint Operating Conceptfor additional information on irregular warfare). These wars will most likely be fought amongst the people. In contrast to the conventional wars of the early twentieth century, future conflicts will require a more thorough understanding of the history, culture, language, politics, economics, and religions of nations and may require significant self-imposed restraints on our employment of violence. In these conflicts, an action – employment of force – will be the message, and noncombatants will interpret our actions from within the narrative of an alien cultural, which we may not fully understand or appreciate.

e. The problems requiring resolution in irregular conflicts amongst the people will be extraordinarily complex in terms of the adversary, friends, and the wider operational environment. Complexity theorists have useful terms and definitions for categorizing complex problems. These terms capture many of the features evident in Operation Iraqi Freedom today and clearly describe the types of operational problems we anticipate in the future. SOD was created as an approach to solving these types of problems.

f. A useful idea taken from complexity theory is the term wicked problem – not wicked in the sense of being evil, but rather intensely challenging and complex. Urban designers Horst Rittel and Melvin Weber coined the term to describe socially complex problems. Wicked problems have the following characteristics:

- There is no definitive way to formulate a wicked problem. Standard templates do not work.
- Wicked problems have no stopping rule; it is impossible to conclusively identify when they have been solved.
- Wicked problems have no right or wrong solutions, only better or worse.
- There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution.
- Wicked problems have no fixed set of potential solutions, no standard templates.
- Every wicked problem is unique and novel.
- Every wicked problem is a symptom of other problems.
- Wicked problems are interactively complex.
- Wicked problems cannot be understood without proposing a solution.

g. Additionally, the social groups that compose the operational problem also have the attributes of complex adaptive systems, which “exhibit coherence under change, via conditional action and anticipation, and they do so without central direction.” Such problems not only demand understanding before initiating operations, but also assessment and learning throughout the campaign because the nature of the problem changes over time. One can easily grasp this

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dynamic by considering that the war in Vietnam was different after the Tet Offensive in 1968 than it was before. The offensive created a new problem for all of the participants, in that what had been a counterinsurgency problem up to that point now included critical aspects of an IO problem as well, whereby elements of the friendly narrative were being dominated by the enemy’s narrative.

h. Current joint and Army doctrinal manuals, like JP 5-0 and FM 3-0, address the need for understanding, but they do not offer tools to help the commander develop a shared understanding with his superiors, subordinates, and staff. The best doctrinal tools available that are staff-centric processes that emphasize analysis today are FM 34-130 for intelligence preparation of the battlefield and JP 2-01.3 TBP for joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE). As many senior commanders have discovered in Iraq, the sections of their staff provide pieces of the overall operational problem, but synthesis of these pieces must take place in the commander’s head. Yet, there exists no formal doctrinal process for testing it and sharing it with subordinates and superiors. In contrast, SOD offers a commander-centric process that emphasizes synthesis and which seeks to develop a shared understanding and mechanisms for further operational learning.

i. UQ 2005 and UQ 2006 demonstrated the requirement for gaining understanding and designing the campaign based upon that understanding. However, while recognizing the value of SOD, many participants found the process unfamiliar, the language arcane, and the fit with existing U.S. doctrinal planning processes somewhat unclear. Shaped by abstract academic disciplines and Israeli military culture, SOD requires adaptation for use in an American cultural context.

9-3. Adapting Systemic Operational Design (SOD) for American Use
The central mechanism in SOD is discourse, a frank and candid professional discussion about operational problems among commanders, political and strategic leaders, and their staffs. The goal of this discourse is to learn; therefore, contrary opinions are encouraged. Discourse fits easily into the cultural context of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF). Junior IDF officers are more willing to offer informed arguments and to challenge a senior officer publicly, yet politely, to a degree that an American peer of equal rank would never attempt. To employ a SOD like methodology in an American context would require a cultural change no less significant than the adoption of the after action review in the 1980s. The use of after action reviews in the U.S. Army institutionalized public criticism of commanders to a degree that was unheard of before that time. But the learning that came from that doctrinal change was critical to the intellectual and operational growth within the U.S. Army in the 1990s and beyond. Similarly, because discourse may appear on the surface to challenge the commander’s authority, its use also requires a significant cultural shift.

a. To foster healthy discourse, in the early stages of designing and planning, commanders must actively encourage their more incisive staff officers and subordinate commanders to challenge their opinions and views, as well as the views and opinions of all the other participants. The participants must understand that learning requires allowing the ideas to compete without regard for the rank of the person who brought the idea into the ring. Everyone involved must have a thick skin and never take offense at having his ideas challenged. Each participant must
sharpen the commander and himself by challenging the ideas of the others in the room intellectually, but without causing personal offense.

b. Discourse uses the products of analysis to synthesize a holistic systemic view of the operational problem. It isn’t enough to have an accurate and detailed appendix about the economy of country X wedged deep in the intelligence annex of a thick operation plan. Instead, the analyst who has this information, this critical piece of the larger puzzle, must participate in a discourse with others to understand how the economy shapes the politics, history, foreign relations, national interests, and aspirations of country X. The expert must have his ideas challenged; an assessment about the economy, which might look true in isolation from other factors, may actually be wrong when viewed from a wider systemic perspective of the whole country and the wider operational environment. To borrow a term from academia, understanding must be *interdisciplinary* rather than *stove piped*.

c. There are several other ideas within SOD which, like discourse, must be translated or transferred into an American context, without losing their value. Because SOD is inspired by several academic disciplines, among them military history, political science, philosophy, and architecture, the original language used to describe the steps of SOD and the questions within those steps are arcane and complex. The translation of some of these ideas from their original contexts – Russian, French, and German – poses a further challenge for those looking at SOD products. However, while these may be obstacles to understanding, they do not detract from the value of the ideas themselves; but they do require translation into terms and language that will speak more clearly to U.S. officers.

d. While some elements of SOD and other planning and decision systems may be incorporated in our future campaign planning, these must be recognized as tools and not as complete answers in and of themselves.

9-4. Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design

a. ARCIC has developed an integrated approach to campaign design that draws from a wide range of sources: recent operational experience, UQ 2003 through UQ 2007, traditional American and Soviet approaches to operational art, SOD, and effects based thinking. This integrated approach is described in TRADOC Pam525-5-500. The section on commander’s appreciation refers to gaining a shared understanding of a complex adaptive operational problem. The section on campaign design refers to the broad approach to problem solving. Individual operational plans must support and conform to the overall design of the campaign.

b. During UQ 2007, four regionally-focused panels employed the Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design (CACD) with great success while facing scenarios that clearly met the criteria of *wicked problems*. All four involved state and non-state actors, interconnected problems, and irregular warfare. The scenarios showed that future adversaries and the operational problems of which they are a part will be largely unfamiliar to traditional planners. CACD allowed teams to frame the operational problems in a way that facilitated designing a problem-solving approach. It also demonstrated the value of engaging superiors professionally in a dialog about the operational problem that must be solved. One lesson gleaned
from this is that the commander at the operational level should seek his superior’s approval both of his problem statement and his mission statement. The use of discourse in the game enabled the teams to frame the original problem and reframe once the problem had changed due to friendly and adversary actions. Army senior leadership at UQ 2007 decided to incorporate CACD in doctrine and instruction at professional schools.

9-5. Way Ahead

a. In September 2007, the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, provided the Commanding General of TRADOC with both an assessment and an implementation plan for incorporating CACD into professional military education and doctrine. This process of incorporation will continue into 2008.

b. The ideas and methods expressed in TRADOC Pam 525-5-500 are only the first step and must be developed further before they can be included in formal doctrine. Among the issues that require further development are the relationship between the procedure described in TRADOC Pam 525-5-500 and existing planning processes. Among these is the question whether the CACD should be inserted within these processes at the front end, or become a separate process completed prior to beginning planning. Resolution of this and other question requires further development.

Chapter 10
Implications

10-1. Overview
This chapter serves to highlight implications of UQ 2007 in three main areas. First, it depicts insights and observations for the Army’s Future Force Capstone Concept, as detailed in TRADOC Pam 525-3-0. Second, it shows how UQ events point to possible solution sets related to the future Modular Force across the DOTMLPF spectrum. Third, it points the way for attempts to continue the maturation of ideas which may still be in their initial stages of development but which hold promise for the Army and the rest of the armed forces in addressing future situations and challenges. Thus, these ideas warrant consideration for inclusion either in the future edition of UQ or in some other sanctioned arena of formal study.

10-2. The Army’s Future Force Capstone Concept

a. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0 provides the overarching vision and framework for how the Army’s future Modular Force will operate. The current edition of this pamphlet also addresses the strategic challenges facing the nation and details the future operational environment based on the most current evaluation of the joint operational environment (JOE) and strategic guidance documents available. It describes not only what the future Modular Force will look like, but how it envisions the future Modular Force will participate in joint operations to achieve full spectrum land force dominance across the range of military operations from the year 2015 through 2024.
b. Part of the central idea contained in TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 is that the Army must *always* plan to conduct operations within a JIM context. TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 also broadly identifies the capabilities required for designing and employing the future Modular Force both in terms of human and material requirements, addressing these in terms of *joint transformation*. It also describes in detail seven key operational ideas that the Army will employ in support of joint operations. These key ideas are: shaping and entry operations, operational maneuver from strategic distances, intratheater operational maneuver, decisive maneuver, concurrent and subsequent stability operations, and distributed support and sustainment. UQ 2007 events focused primarily on questions related to both shaping and stability operations.

10-3. **DOTMLPF Implications for the Army Capstone Concept**

a. Two insights from UQ 2007 that appear to have major DOTMLPF implications involve concepts, force design, and employment of Army CA capabilities, and the concept of an Army organization to serve as a force multiplier in efforts involving BPC, specifically the TMAAG-F idea. Chapter 8 of this publication outlines the detailed recommendations and DOTMLPF implications related to CA. Chapter 7 and appendix C describe the insights into possible organization and function of the TMAAG-F.

b. Since U.S. interagency partners and the associated public diplomacy will continue to play critical roles in the foreseeable future, and since those capabilities are not usually designed to be expeditionary in nature during initial stages of military campaigns, the joint force commander must plan for the employment of Army CA capabilities both before and throughout a future conflict to establish the initial basic underpinnings for those JIM capabilities within the AOR. Although the TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 addresses the important roles that operations by U.S. interagency partners and stability operations play, these can sometimes be marginalized in the early stages of planning and while executing joint combat operations. The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught that military action alone does not suffice when the real problems are rooted in the social, cultural, and political narratives of a given realm.

10-4. **How Unified Quest (UQ) 2007 Insights Inform the Army Capstone Concept**

The TP 525-3-0 revision process will include a review of key insights learned from UQ 2007 and 2008. Specific recommendations from UQ 2007 for consideration for incorporation into the next edition of the TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 include the following:

a. **Strategic Context.** Insights from both the Strategic Guidance Seminar and the Senior Leader Forum highlight the requirement for all agencies of the U.S. Government to operate within letter and intent of international law and with the consent of regional and local governance. The perception of *legitimacy* is critical in strategic actions. Legitimacy can generally be validated in the eyes of the world through obtaining a mandate backed by the United Nations or a United Nations Security Council resolution. Strategic communication through a consistent *narrative* is also a vital requirement. *Information engagement*, addressed in chapter 2 of this document as an element of the strategic context, addresses this issue as well. Lastly, there must be a thorough examination and formalization of the concept of persistent conflict leading into the revision cycle for the TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, as this may very well serve as the formulation behind a strategic *theory of conflict* underlying all U.S. strategic planning efforts.
within the foreseeable future, and thus provide a major driver for the emerging TRADOC Pam 525-3-0.

b. **Joint Framework.** The TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 must address concepts for applying military force within a defined political and/or diplomatic context and for developing doctrinal and organizational structures and mechanisms to ensure long-term, coherent, JIM participation.

c. **FSO.** Foremost is the need for a campaign quality, expeditionary force capable conducting of FSO. The focus is on the campaign quality aspect with emphasis on near-, mid- and long-term strategies. Those strategies must address the complexity of operating on the modern battlefield where political and/or diplomatic action plays just as important a role, if not more important, as military action alone. Also of concern is the ability of the Army to operate continually in an environment of irregular warfare with regular, general purpose forces tailored to mission requirements, without losing their edge in maintaining basic core competencies.

### 10-5. Key Ideas and Insights Warranting Further Development

a. **Persistent Security.** This idea evolved from UQ 2007 and Headquarters, TRADOC has added it to its lexicon of strategic and operational art and science, coupled with the term, persistent conflict, in order to describe an end state and operational environment (see chaps 3 and 6 of this publication). UQ 2008 will continue to explore persistent security but in terms of setting the conditions for enduring security. USJFCOM, the proponent for the JOE, and TRADOC, the Army proponent, have accepted persistent conflict as an appropriate term to describe the operational environment and the challenges of the twenty first century and will incorporate the term in future reversions of the JOE. UQ 2008 events will include further examination of both persistent security and persistent conflict, with seminar war game events specifically dedicated to better understanding these notions.

b. **BPC.**

(1) BPC has the potential to serve as a foundation upon which to build a broad set of strategic capabilities for the future. Accordingly, it will serve as a major area of investigation during UQ 2008. Army contributions to military activities in support of BPC could be substantially improved through a reorganized and expanded CA capability and through a new regionally-focused structure such as the TMAAG-F. In contingencies, partnership capacity at the national level must also be improved and solidified with other U.S. interagency partners. If this cannot be accomplished rapidly in post-conflict settings, the Army must be able to build the necessary capacities from within until such time as U.S. interagency partners can be authorized, manned, equipped, and trained to fulfill these mission requirements themselves for the long term.

(2) BPC also holds promise as a potential way to gain control of ungoverned, under-governed and misgoverned spaces where enduring security has yet to be established in key regions of the world. Here, the Army may face the task of developing essential services, infrastructure, support mechanisms, and governance to establish security until local, regional or national level indigenous services and governance can be built up and assume responsibility.
(3) UQ 2008 will include two seminar events specifically designed to investigate approaches to BPC: The first will examine the nature and scope of military activities required to support a strategy of BPC; the second will explore BPC as a possible centerpiece of a new national strategy that focuses all government agencies to achieve our national security objectives. In so doing, this later event will consider ways to build capacity within both U.S. Southern Command and the newly created U.S. African Command.

c. **TMAAG-F.** Headquarters TRADOC issued a directive to the CAC to examine and develop possible organizational constructs for the TMAAG-F. The report of that formal study, detailing the mission and design of the TMAAG-F to be able to influence the Army’s next force design update cycle. Upon completion of this initial concept, this construct can be further developed and evaluated.

d. **Operational Command.** Proponency within the Army for continued development of the concept of command at the operational level of war remains with Headquarters TRADOC, ARIC FWD. Senior Leader Forum events, bringing together the senior leadership of the armed forces responsible for developing concepts and doctrine, are scheduled to take place during the upcoming year in order to further develop ideas and approaches related to operational command. For a description of the subjects considered in this forum, please refer to appendix D.

e. **CACD.** Originally developed and evaluated as a staff tool used in the UQ 2007 seminar war games and STAFFEX, CACD has developed into a cognitive model in its own right. Its basic tenets have already been accepted by senior Army leaders and are soon to be considered for inclusion in Army doctrine. Currently, CACD is being integrated into the curriculum taught at the USAWC and the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. As of the writing of this document, the USAWC and CAC are assessing CACD for possible incorporation into other professional military education courses such as intermediate level education, the School for Command Preparation, and the Battle Command Training Program.

### 10-6. Baseline Study Plan and Framework for UQ 2008 Events

FWSP explains in outline how UQ 2008 will focus on establishing and maintaining conditions of persistent security in an environment of persistent conflict through the activities and capabilities associated with BPC (see figure 10-1). The FWSP includes the development of a notional NSS focused on promoting and maintaining the stability necessary to manage regional violence at levels that do not threaten the interests of the U.S., its allies, and allied or partner countries. The military component of this strategy focuses on supporting BPC activities while retaining the ability to conduct FSO in order to reduce instability and set the conditions for persistent security. The means for building the necessary strategic depth will likely include, among other things, expanding and optimizing CA capabilities, and may be assisted by standing up organizations such as the TMAAG-F under ASCCs to enhance the regional efforts of GCCs. These efforts can only be achieved through unity of effort among of the various U.S. interagency partners, the military, and NGOs, coupled with the cooperation of local, regional and national governments. Clearly, meeting these and the other challenges listed in this document will require continued building upon the key ideas from UQ 2007.
Figure 10-1: UQ 2008 Schedule of Events
Appendix A

References

Section I
Required Publications

This section contains no entries.

Section II
Related Publications
A related publication is a source of additional information. The user does not have to read a related reference to understand this publication.

FM 3-0
Operations.

FM 3-05.40
Civil Affairs Operations.

FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5
Counterinsurgency.

FM 5-0
Army Planning and Orders Production.

FM 34-130
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.

FM 41-10
Civil Affairs Operations.

FM 100-5
Operations.

Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept. (Available at http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/iw_joc1_0.pdf.)

JP 1
Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States
TRADOC Pam 525-5-300

JP 1-02
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

JP 2-01.3
Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace.

JP 3-0
Joint Operations.

JP 3-31
Command and Control for Joint Land Operations.

JP 5-0
Joint Operation Planning.


TRADOC Pamphlet 525-2-1
The United States Army Functional Concept for See 2015-2024.

TRADOC Pam 525-3-0

TRADOC Pam 525-3-1
The United States Army’s Operating Concept for Operational Maneuver 2015-2024.

TRADOC Pam 525-3-2
The United States Army Concept for Tactical Maneuver 2015-2024.

TRADOC Pam 525-3-3
The United States Army Functional Concept for Battle Command 2015-2024.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-4
The United States Army Functional Concept for Strike 2015-2024.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-5
The United States Army Functional Concept for Protect 2015-2024.
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-6
The United States Army Functional Concept for Move 2015-2024.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-4-1
The United States Army Functional Concept for Sustain 2015-2024.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500
Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design


Other Non-DOD References


Schmitt, John. *A Systemic Concept for Operational Design*. Quantico, VA.


Appendix B
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for Future FSO

B-1. Campaign Phases in Detail

In chapter 7, this publication described the background and elements involved in developing a CONOPS for future FSO. Below are the details of that type of campaign, depicting the major players by their roles and functions, and the operations of the campaign by phase. Keep in mind while reading it through, that it is designed to defeat the anticipated campaign strategy and tactics of near-term opponents of the U.S. FWD must still design other Service and the USSOCOM contributions to the concept and test the whole concept in experiments and war games.

B-2. Roles and Functions of the Major Campaign Contributing Elements

For the purposes of describing this campaign, the CONOPS uses a construct employing a notional nation state, called Redland. It is an Islamic state maintaining neither formal ties to nor ongoing diplomatic relations with the U.S.

In actual practice, modular blue forces would most likely seize areas which are not contiguous. In the graphics for the following campaign phase descriptions, for simplicity in describing the campaign only, while recognizing the need for true FSO, blue forces are depicted as seizing one contiguous area at a time. As the phase narratives show, there is a wide range of operations ongoing concurrently throughout the AOR in each phase.

a. U.S. Mission Redland:

(1) Is the executive agent for changing the government of Redland; supported by military forces under combined joint task force- Redland (CJTF-R).

(2) Is led by an ambassador accredited to the supported government in exile and/or opposition group.

(3) Is assumed to exist outside Redland (no diplomatic mission exists in Redland or it is withdrawn) during initial phases.


b. Military Assistance Group (MILGP) Redland:

(1) Forms during the final phase (Phase n) using staff from CJTF-R and multinational corps (MNC)-B that execute FID.
(2) Serves as the SAO for Redland (see JP 3-07.1, chap 2), but with combat training, advising, and combat support mission as well.

(3) Should be commanded by a combat arms officer (not the defense attaché).

(4) Directed and supervised by the U.S. Chief of Mission; under administrative control of service components; coordinates with the GCC.

c. CJTF-Redland:

(1) The combined and joint force command that plans and conducts all operations within Redland from Phase 1 to Phase \( n \).

(2) May operate covertly during Phase 1.

(3) Serves as the land component command through MNC-A and MNC-B.

d. Multinational corps (MNC)-A:

(1) Built around a corps or division from either the Army or Marine Corps.

(2) Phase I to Phase \( n \) – Plans and conducts majority of large unit conventional missions including forced entry, raids, and expansion of the enclave and strategic raids.

e. MNC-B:

(1) Built around a corps or division from either the Army or Marine Corps.

(2) Phases I to Phase \( n \) – Conducts SSTRO and FID behind the MNC-A rear boundary.

(3) Forms Military Group Redland and releases control of SSTRO and FID missions to Military Group Redland in Phase \( n \).

f. Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force:

(1) Establishes an opposition party – overt or covert.

(2) Establishes an armed insurgency.

(3) Infiltrates government agencies – including the military.

(4) Undermines WMD/E research and development.

(5) Locates existing WMD/E weapons and facilities.

(6) Locates Redland anti-access capabilities.
Conducts influence and IO.

Conducts strategic raids.

g. Combined Joint Force Theater Support Command:

(1) Opens sea ports and airfields.

(2) Improves logistics hubs and main supply routes (MSR).

(3) Executes all distribution operations within the theater.

h. Special Teams and Organizations:

(1) Perform limited FID tasks for specific periods.

(2) Provide training and technical assistance.

(3) Managed by MILGP-R; security assistance activities funded by Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act; combat activities funded by Title 10 USC.

B-3. Multi-Phase Campaign

In order to address the way the nature of this offensive campaign changes as it progresses, it is divided into distinct phases. *Note that the numbering of these phases does not correspond to the traditional standard numbering of phases as depicted in current joint publications.* The phasing distinctions consider that actions of several joint doctrinal phases could be occurring concurrently in *any one* of the phases below.

**Phase 0: Shaping.** U.S. and coalition partners’ actions dissuade or deter potential adversaries.

**Phase 1: Irregular Warfare.** U.S. and coalition partners establish an opposition party and armed insurgency; conduct international influence operations; locate enemy WMD/E and anti-access means; and set conditions for future phases.

**Phase 2: Entry/Establish Enclaves.** Neutralize enemy WMD/E and anti-access means; large tactical units then secure enclaves; conditions are set for SSTRO and FID to begin within secured areas.

**Phase 3 to Phase (n-1): Expanding the Enclaves.** SSTRO and FID begin and continue in secured areas; combined conventional, unconventional, and irregular operations expand the enclave or enclaves.

**Phase n: Consolidation.** Government institutions are reestablished at all levels; FID; neutralization of remaining insurgent formations; continued SSTRO; transition to Post-Conflict.
B-4. Phases

Phase 0:


Shaping Operation: U.S. forces conduct influence operations and UW in order to gain international support, to undermine Redland government’s legitimacy, to increase public dissatisfaction with the government, and to establish a network of agents within Redland.

Decisive Operations: U.S. forces and U.S. interagency partners establish or support an opposition party – overt or covert – and infiltrate Redland government agencies – including the military – in order to dissuade or deter Redland threats to U.S. national interests. U.S. forces – to include U.S. interagency partners – also locate existing WMD/E weapons and facilities and Redland anti-access capabilities for later targeting.

Sustaining Operations: U.S. forces logistically supported by existing USEUCOM AOR structure.

Transition: Phase 1 ends once: The President has directed USEUCOM to overthrow the government of Redland and establish a new government.
Phase 1:

Assumptions: Sufficient groundwork laid for:

- Clandestine intelligence and operational infrastructure.
- Over flight rights.
- Liberty and provisioning ports.
- Intermediate staging bases.
- Information and influence operations.
- Minimizing potential international condemnation of U.S. actions for initiating military operations in this and later phases.
- USSOCOM assets sufficient for the conduct of UW operations.
- Sufficient political dissatisfaction with the existing hostile regime and its policies, coupled with the identification of potential friendly political leaders.
- GCC and DOS isolation efforts against Redland adequate to prevent support from other nations within the region – sanctuary, finances, etc.
- DOS has an adequate deception plan/plan of action in the event of compromise of UW operations or capture of U.S. personnel.

Mission: On order, CJTF-R attacks to overthrow the government of Redland and establish a stable federal republic in order to remove a source of global instability, source of WMD/E proliferation, and breeding ground for terrorist organizations.
Shaping Operation: U.S. Forces conduct influence operations and UW in order to gain international support, to undermine Redland government’s legitimacy, to increase public dissatisfaction with the government of Redland, and to establish a network of agents within Redland. Assist in BPC in preparation for establishing control of the population.

Decisive Operations: Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF) – Redland (R) establishes an opposition party – overt or covert, establishes an armed insurgency, infiltrates government agencies – including the military, undermines WMD/E research and development, locates existing WMD/E weapons and facilities, and locates Redland anti-access capabilities for later targeting.

Sustaining Operations: U.S. forces logistically supported by existing USEUCOM AOR structure.

Transition: Phase 1 ends once:

- Indigenous political party established
- Indigenous insurgency established
- Government legitimacy weakened
- WMD/E vulnerable to strike/raids or development delayed.
- Anti-access capabilities located and vulnerable to neutralization measures.
Phase 2:

Assumptions:

- Continuation of assumptions from previous phase
- U.S. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR) ensures secure sea lanes for support throughout the AOR for the duration.
- CJTF-R and MILGP-R are sufficiently robust to participate in Multinational Corps – Alpha (MNC-A) and Multinational Corps – Bravo (MNC-B) pre-deployment training.

Mission: On order, CJTF-R attacks to overthrow the government of Redland and establish a stable federal republic in order to remove a source of global instability, source of WMD/E proliferation, and breeding ground for terrorist organizations.

Shaping Operation: CJTF-R conducts influence operations and UW in order to gain international support, to undermine Redland government’s legitimacy, to deceive the Redland Army about the timing and location of CJTF-R attacks, to destroy Redland anti-access capabilities, to disrupt Redland defenses, and to destroy WMD/E. Combined Joint Force Maritime Component Command (CJFMCC) and JUWTF-R conduct strategic raids throughout Redland. Combined Joint Force Air Component Command (CJFACC) destroys strategic targets.
throughout Redland, interdicts and disrupts operational targets, and conducts close air support of all land forces.
Once the conditions are set, MNC-A clears Redland conventional forces in AO 1 and secures phase line (PL) BLUE in order to establish the conditions for unhindered stability and reconstruction operations. MNC-A will clear Redland conventional forces company size and larger from AO 1.

**Decisive Operations:** As MNC-A advances, MNC-B will secure the MNF-R rear area, conducting stability operations in AO 1 in order to reestablish effective local and regional government, generate indigenous security forces, and conduct FID. MNC-B IO and PSYOPS will build popular support for new government institutions within AO 1 and undermine Redland government’s legitimacy in areas outside coalition control.

**Sustaining Operations:** Combined Joint Force Theater Sustainment Command (CJFTSC) opens sea ports and airfields, and executes all distribution operations within the theater.

**Transition:** Phase 2 ends once MNC-A has cleared Redland conventional forces company size and larger from AO 1 and secured PL BLUE.
Phase 3:

Assumptions:

- Continuation of assumptions from previous phases
- USG will not mandate political cleansing (complete dismantling of existing societal and local/district/provincial governmental structures due to political associations with the former regime).
- Former regime leaders will be vetted in place.

Mission: On order, CJTF-R attacks to overthrow the government of Redland and establish a stable federal republic in order to remove a source of global instability, source of WMD/E proliferation, and breeding ground for terrorist organizations.

Shaping Operation: MNC-A, CJFACC, and JUWTF-R conduct influence operations and UW throughout AOs 2-4 in order to undermine Redland government’s legitimacy, to deceive the Redland Army about the timing and location of CJTF-R attacks, to disrupt Redland defenses, and to destroy WMD/E. CJFACC destroys strategic targets throughout Redland, interdicts and disrupts operational targets, and conducts close air support of all land forces.

Decisive Operations: MNC-B conducts stability operations within AO 1 behind the MNC-A rear boundary. MNC-B re-establishes local government, generates indigenous security forces, and conducts FID. MNC-B conducts influence operations to gain international support and undermine popular support for the Redland government.
**Sustaining Operations:** CJFTSC continues to open sea ports and airfields, improves logistics hubs and MSRs, and executes all distribution operations within the theater.

**Continued Shaping Operation:** Once the conditions for decisive operations are set, MNC-A clears RED conventional forces in AO 2 and secures PL GREEN in order to establish the conditions for unhindered stability and reconstruction operations. MNC-A will clear Redland conventional forces *company size and larger* from AO 2.

**Continued Decisive Operations:** As MNC-A advances, MNC-B will secure the MNF-R rear area, conducting stability operations in AOs 1 and 2 in order to reestablish effective local and regional government, generate indigenous security forces, and conduct FID. MNC-B information and PSYOPS will build popular support for new government institutions and undermine Redland government’s legitimacy in areas outside coalition control.

**Transition:** Phase 3 ends once MNC-A has cleared Redland conventional forces *company size and larger* from AO 2 and secured PL GREEN.
**Mission:** On order, CJTF-R attacks to overthrow the government of Redland and establish a stable federal republic in order to remove a source of global instability, source of WMD/E proliferation, and breeding ground for terrorist organizations.

**Shaping Operations:** MNC-B psychological and influence operations will build popular support for new government institutions. MNC-B, CJFMCC and JUWTF-R conduct IO and UW throughout Redland to destroy any remaining insurgent groups. CJFACC interdicts tactical targets and conducts close air support of all land forces.

**Decisive Operation:** MNC-B conducts FID throughout all of Redland in order to reestablish effective national, regional, and local government, generate indigenous security forces, and support reconstruction.

**Sustaining Operations:** CJFTSC continues to open sea ports and airfields, improves logistics hubs and MSRs, and executes all distribution operations within the theater.

**Transition:** Phase \( n \) ends once MNC-B has reestablished government institutions at the local, regional, and national level throughout Redland; and generated sufficient indigenous security forces to defend Redland against domestic unrest and external threats.

**When Phase \( n \) ends:** MNC-B completes transition to the MILGP-R. During Phases 2 to Phase \( n \), MILGP-R is a component of the MNC-B staff, coordinating with U.S. Mission REDLAND. MILGP-R conducts security assistance with the new government of Redland and provides...
command and control of all coalition training teams still in Redland upon completion of conventional operations, under the direction of the U.S. Chief of Mission to Redland.

**As Phase n transitions to Post-Conflict:** MILGP-R is the SAO for Redland, but with a combat training, advising, and combat support mission as well. Special Teams and Organizations rotate into Redland to perform FID for specific periods.

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**Phase (n) - Command Relationships**

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*Relationship defined by directive or MOA.
**Relationship defined by law (US Code).*
Post-Conflict - Command Relationships

[Diagram showing relationships between various military commands and organizations, including EUCOM, U.S. Mission - R, USAFE, NAVEUR, MARFOREUR, USAREUR, SOCEUR, MILGP-R, and Special Teams & Organizations.]

Legend:
- COCOM
- OPCON
- TACON
- Supporting
- Direction / Supervision
- Coord. Info Rcvd
- ADCON
- USC

*Relationship defined by directive or MOA.
**Relationship defined by law (US Code).
Appendix C
TMAAG-F Conceptual Underpinnings and Organizational Options

C-1. General
This appendix serves to provide an examination of current approved Army operational and functional concepts which support the TMAAG-F idea. This is important, in that any new idea which impacts anywhere within the approved elements of any of the DOTMLPF domains must have recognized and approved conceptual underpinnings, or else be subjected to the formal scrutiny that comes with any new concept. This appendix also shows several organizational structures that could serve as candidates for the TMAAG-F.

C-2. Conceptual Underpinnings of TMAAG-F
All of the current Army concept strategy publications derive their situations and solution synopses from the common JOE set during the 2015-2024 timeframe. This connection is reflected in chapter 2 of each of the current functional concept documents. All concepts are rooted in Army doctrine as points of departure and are nested as well within the family of joint operational concepts. Some specific references or hooks within the Army concept strategy concepts that relate to and support the idea of the TMAAG-F follow:

a. TRADOC Pam 525-3-0: Discussion of shaping and entry operations, shown in figure 5, envisions long-term engagement in the potential joint operations area. The emphasis on multidimensional operations and interagency collaboration in chapter 2 (paras 2-4 and 2-5) along with the multinational operations covered in paragraph 2-6 strongly argue for a TMAAG-F presence before conflict. The concept describes the “complex human terrain” and calls for establishing favorable security conditions. It goes on to emphasize the need for strengthening our allies and partners.

b. TRADOC Pam 525-3-1: Like the capstone concept, and all Army concepts, this publication covers FSO across the range of military operations. Figures 2-1 and 2-2 of this document depict this and highlight the necessity for engagement before conflict in shaping operations, and continuously during conflict, to include establishing stability mechanisms. Continuous analysis of the enemy situation using political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) analytical elements – a joint paradigm – can be accomplished suitably with the capabilities envisioned for an organization like the TMAAG-F.

c. TRADOC Pam 525-3-2: In addition to continuing the emphasis on FSO, this publication emphasizes the importance of JIM cooperation, along with cooperation with NGOs. (see fig 3-1). It also cites an increasing level of cooperation with the SOF community.

d. TRADOC Pam 525-3-3: This concept provides an overarching depiction of how commanders should visualize, describe, and direct operations through a continuous process of planning, preparing, executing, assessing, and framing and reframing. This concept places critical emphasis on the functions of situational awareness and situational understanding and calls for leader development that emphasizes multinational and interagency exposure. It is very close to the TRADOC Pam 525-2-1.
e. TRADOC Pam 525-2-1:

(1) Calls for integrated knowledge of the theater environment, such as terrain, weather, infrastructure, culture, demographics, and neutral entities: “Understanding the environment in which the future Modular Force finds itself, in particular, understanding the perceptions of partners and the other human elements of the environment is a key determinant of success.”

(2) This concept also emphasizes JIM operations: “As a part of a larger networked team, the future Modular Force must plan and execute in complete concert with other services, nations, and agencies. As each element of the force collaboratively accomplishes critical joint and coalition missions, rapid teaming and self-synchronized operations will require a more complete understanding of the operational environment.”

f. TRADOC Pam 525-3-4: “Building trust and understanding must begin early in institutional settings and then be reinforced by operational experience.” This publication also calls for cultural expertise. Soldiers with language skills and knowledge of the local culture will provide commanders with expertise they can use to communicate with adversaries and adversarial civilian populations and serve as catalyst to help direct activities and initiatives which help restore basic services and rebuild critical infrastructure.

g. TRADOC Pam 525-3-5:

(1) Outlines several pertinent points, such as the “training of host nation forces. A well trained and capable host nation military force reduces the protection requirements the future Modular Force must provide to the host nation and will augment and support the U.S. military. The Modular Force may initially establish and administer training centers, provide training cadres, and provide advisors to operational host nation forces. A working knowledge of language, customs, and laws will assist in a successful effort. This training requirement may extend to host nation law enforcement organizations. However, given their comparable subject matter expertise, these organizations are best trained by other civilian law enforcement counterparts from supporting multi-national countries.”

(2) This concept also states: “global engagement with friendly nations and multinational military forces will shape future operations. This is achieved by conducting exercises, training military and civil security forces, and gaining valuable situational awareness of key locations around the world. By preparing the region during times of relative peace the host nation will be better prepared to protect itself, thereby decreasing the requirement for a commitment of U.S. forces. An intimate understanding of the area provides a knowledge base to plan for future joint protection requirements.”

h. TRADOC Pam 525-3-6: The key hook in this publication is the notion of strategic and operational deployment and movements that involve the use of aerial ports of debarkation, sea ports of debarkation, and other worldwide infrastructure. Obviously, having TMAAG-F presence in potential trouble spots within a given GCC facilitates knowledge and coordination for the use of these facilities.
i. TRADOC Pam 525-4-1: Similar to TRADOC Pam 525-3-6, this publication cites the importance of multinational operations and existing infrastructure to facilitate uninterrupted sustainment operations.

C-3. Options for TMAAG-F Organization
There are several organizational models that could execute the functions of a TMAAG-F. The following paragraphs describe in general terms four possible candidate organizations:

a. **Type 1.** A bare-bones headquarters element, as shown below in figure C-1, that would coordinate theater requirements, sourcing, flow, and Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration through the ARFORGEN and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. The staff would coordinate with:

- Military training teams specializing in training conventional forces at the small unit level.
- Embedded training teams consisting of 3-12 members embedded down in the army units of the assisted nation, providing not only training, but mentoring as well. These teams would also advise BCTs when tasked and accompany conventional forces during their deployments, but could remain in-country after the BCTs redeploy.
- Human terrain teams consisting of four-five members each, specializing in the culture and politics of the focal country for each team.
- Forward-based joint SOF teams, including military liaison elements, military information support teams, civil and military liaison elements, and Special Forces anchor teams, as outlined in the 2006 USSOCOM Capstone Concept for Special Operations.

b. **Type 2.** A headquarters element as described above, but with an enhanced coordination element in its operations cell to oversee three to five military advisory teams, each roughly the size of an Operational Detachment Alpha, which would provide assessment and feedback to

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**Figure C-1: TMAAG-F (Type 1)**

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TMAAG-F. The staff would still coordinate the activities of the remaining subordinate elements. The headquarters would be organized as follows:

c. Type 3. A standard headquarters element with full coordinating staff (intelligence, operations, plans, logistics, etc.), with attached forces rotating regularly, to which the smaller elements can be assigned as indicated below:

d. Type 4. A full-up organization with a standard headquarters and staff, and with standing units assigned as illustrated below in figure C-4:
Figure C-4: TMAAG-F (Type 4)
Appendix D
Operational Level Command White Paper

Note: This appendix is the white paper presented by JTF Operational Level Command at the 2007 Senior Leader Forum co-hosted by the Commander, TRADOC and the Commander, FORSCOM.

Scope

This white paper is a reflection of four Senior Leader Forums held over the course of a year. During that time, senior joint and Service leaders discussed and explored the “art and science of operational-level command.” The paper is organized into four areas: a description of operational-level command; operational-level challenges; the four key ideas that the participants in the forums discussed; and the conclusions.

The initial section in the body of this paper briefly discusses operational-level command as it as defined in joint doctrine and with additional insights from the SLF participants. With the nature of operational-level command established, this paper discusses the problematic conditions that challenge operational-level commanders. These challenges have several aspects, affecting the utility of professional terms, the importance of unified action, the duration of campaigns and major operations, and a commander’s ability to understand operational problems. The rise of irregular warfare, as described in JP 1, the fact that even traditional wars today often have irregular aspects, and the increase in non-linear operations means that commanders must have the capability to overcome complexity. This paper discusses several broad ideas that may offer insights on how to address these challenges. Theory of conflict, complexity, understanding, and strategic art are the four key ideas that emerged from the year-long study effort. Finally, this paper identifies implications for doctrine, leader development, training, and personnel as possible avenues for further analysis and potential experimentation, development, and implementation.

Operational-Level Command

This section focuses on operational-level command—the central theme of the SLF series of seminars and this paper. The section begins with a brief discussion of all levels of war to put the operational level in perspective. It follows with a summary of the tenets of operational art and design, and concludes by highlighting characteristics, responsibilities, and insights from seminar participants on operational-level command.

Levels of War

Three levels of war—strategic, operational, and tactical—help clarify the links between national strategic objectives and tactical actions. There are no finite limits or boundaries between them. Levels of command, sizes of units, types of equipment, or types and locations of forces or components are not associated with a particular level. National assets such as intelligence and communications satellites, previously considered principally in a strategic context, are also significant resources in support of tactical operations. Forces or assets may be employed for a strategic, operational, or tactical purpose based on their contributions to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives; but often the accuracy of these labels may be determined only during historical studies. These levels help commanders to visualize a logical arrangement of
operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to an appropriate command. However, commanders at every level must be aware that in a world of constant, immediate communications, any single action may have consequences at all levels.

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**Operational Art Is …**

- About translating strategic purpose into tactical action
- Always joint, multinational, and interagency
- Always integrated with diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts
- About campaigns and major operations
- About arranging battles, engagements, and military activities
- About focusing power at the decisive times and places

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The strategic level is that level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational—alliance or coalition—strategic objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives. The joint force commander (JFC) at the operational level of war links the tactical employment of forces as part of unified action to achieve national and military strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on the design and conduct of strategies, campaigns, and major operations and the organization and employment military forces. Commanders at the tactical level focus on planning and executing battles, engagements, and activities to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces.

### Operational Art and Design

As defined in JP 3-0, operational art is *“the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces.”* Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war (see fig D-1). It is the thought process commanders use to visualize how best to employ military capabilities efficiently and effectively in order to accomplish their missions. It helps commanders and their staffs order their thoughts and understand the operational environment and the necessary conditions for success before determining the ways and means to achieve objectives and accomplish the mission. Operational art also promotes *unified action* by helping JFCs and staffs understand how to facilitate the integration of other agencies and multinational partners toward achieving the national and theater strategic end states. Among many considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions.

- What conditions must be created to achieve the objectives? (Ends)
- What sequence of actions is most likely to create those conditions? (Ways)
- What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)
- What is the likely cost or risk in performing that sequence of actions?
As stated in JP 3-0, operational art is applied during operational design—*the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or joint operation plan and its subsequent execution*. While operational art is the manifestation of informed vision and creativity, operational design is the practical extension of the creative process. Together they synthesize the intuition and creativity of the commander with the analytical and logical process of design. Operational design is helpful during all steps of the planning process. Resulting design alternatives provide the basis for selecting a viable course of action and developing a detailed concept of operations. JP 5-0 states that during execution, commanders and their staffs continue to consider design elements—such as *termination, center of gravity, effects, and lines of operations*—and adjust both current operations and future plans as the operation unfolds.

**Operational-level Command**

Commanders at all levels share certain common responsibilities. For example, they have command authority over their organizations; they can issue orders and direct the employment of capabilities under their command; they must coordinate with higher, supporting, and adjacent commands—other components of the higher commander’s force; and they are responsible for everything their organizations do or fail to do. Commanders at all levels receive tasks from their next higher commands, and they determine how to accomplish these by employing their capabilities in time, space, and purpose to accomplish a mission.

A commander at the operational level has these same responsibilities. But the nature of command at the operational level means that this commander typically is the linchpin for planning and directing operational-level actions and assigning tactical tasks that will achieve military—and national in some cases—strategic objectives. More than any other, this commander will use operational art and design to determine the resources and sequence of actions required to create the conditions that will achieve these objectives within an acceptable level of risk. This commander will synchronize, coordinate, and/or integrate the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities and multinational operations with U.S. military operations to achieve unity of effort. This means that this commander must maintain a broad perspective and understand the relationship of the military instrument of national power to the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments. This commander must consider how the capabilities of various agencies can be used to best advantage in order to assist in accomplishing operational-level tasks and strategic objectives. The operational-level commander also typically is the one who responds to senior U.S. military and civilian leaders regarding the details of the operation during both planning and execution.

While there is no doctrinally-prescribed force echelon for meeting the operational level requirements, a joint force commander typically is the operational-level commander who shoulders the responsibilities mentioned above. Often this is a JTF or combined task force (CTF) commander, but also could be the combatant commander (CCDR). This decision depends on a variety of factors, including the magnitude of the operation, concurrent operations in the CCDR’s AOR, and availability of potential operational-level headquarters. For example, General Norman Schwarzkopf (commander of U.S. Central Command) did not create subordinate joint force headquarters to plan and execute Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf conflict. Central Command Headquarters developed the plan and General Schwarzkopf essentially functioned at both the theater-strategic and
operational levels during execution. In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf conflict, Operation Provide Comfort (a foreign humanitarian assistance operation) was executed beginning in April 1991 under the authority of U.S. European Command. As the operational-level commander, Lieutenant General John Shalikashvili commanded CTF Provide Comfort to protect and provide assistance to Kurds fleeing their homes in northern Iraq.

Operational-level requirements are not exclusive to a JFC. For example, a JTF’s Service and functional component commanders will collaborate with the JTF commander during planning, and will advise the JFC on the employment of their components’ capabilities. The JTF’s component operations may require direct interface between the component headquarters and theater and national supporting capabilities and coordination with supporting combatant commands and agencies, an operational-level function. Such interface and coordination is routine when the CCDR commands operations with no intermediate JTF, as in the Persian Gulf Conflict example. In some cases, a contingency may be more appropriately resolved by a single Service component headquarters and forces rather than with a joint headquarters and forces. Such operations will occur almost always under the authority of a GCC, but the Service component headquarters will have operational-level requirements nonetheless.

An essential aspect of operational-level command is maintaining a broad perspective and understanding of the operational environment. In this context, the operational environment is not restricted to the operational level. JP 5-0 defines the operational environment as the “composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.” This expansion of the former battlespace construct may be applied at any level. But it is particularly important that operational-level commanders understand the application of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) instruments of U.S. and multinational power relative to the political, military, economic, social, informational, infrastructure (PMESII), and other systems in the operational environment. Developing this systems view can further a commonly shared understanding and visualization of the existing and desired environment among members of the JIM team. This promotes unity of effort by facilitating a common perspective of the conditions that must be created in order to achieve strategic objectives. The systems perspective also relates directly to the assessment process and to elements of operational design such as center of gravity, decisive point, and lines of operations.
Figure D-2: Attributes of Operational Thinking

The SLF participants shared their perceptions and insights on operational command during the seminars and in questionnaires. For example, one briefing suggested a set of attributes of operational thinking, listed in figure 2. The same briefing described influences on operational thinking. These included institutional influences such as Service culture and common military education, doctrine, and training; direct influences such as the commander’s combat experience, wargames and exercises, and command experience; and indirect influences such as religion, national and international politics, and study of military history. Based on seminar discussions and questionnaires, a number of characteristics, traits, and other factors emerged that are considered essential for commanders at the operational level. Many of these are desirable for other commanders as well, but are particularly relevant to the requirements of operational-level command. Examples of explicit and implicit characteristics follow:

- **Achieve and maintain a broad perspective on the operational environment.** Conflicts, particularly in irregular warfare, are not just military against military. Understand the use of friendly instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) and their impacts on the operational environment (political, military, economic, social, informational, infrastructure, and others).
- **Personal relationships count in the JIM world.** Build these relationships and foster trust and confidence with these partners. Good communication skills are critical.
- **Be inclusive versus exclusive** with JIM partners in planning, executing, assessing, and decisionmaking.
Focus on unity of effort, not unity of command. Recognize the reality of your partners’ different perspectives, authorities, and goals. Strive to arrive at a common understanding of necessary conditions to achieve objectives. Work to maximize their total complementary and reinforcing effects while minimizing their relative vulnerabilities.

Understand the strategic context of specified and implied operational-level and tactical tasks.

Stay at the operational level. Set conditions for operational and tactical success. Delegate authority to subordinates to fight the tactical fight.

Decentralize execution where possible to retain agility and speed of action.

Be prepared to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty.

Become proficient in operational art and design through study and practice. As a JFC, require subordinate Service and functional commanders to do the same.

Convey the design through commander’s vision, guidance, intent, and a clear campaign concept. The operational level commander’s success is linked directly to subordinate commanders’ abilities to understand and execute the campaign concept clearly. Clear intent and guidance provide clarity for subordinates in a dynamic, ambiguous environment.

Challenges

SLF leaders spent considerable time discussing the changing geostrategic and operational environments, styles of warfare, and complexity of problems that emerge at the operational level. While the leaders at SLF I thru IV did not identify a discrete operational-level problem, they did identify several problematic conditions. These provided the central challenge and impetus for the operational command study and this white paper. While not a majority view of the attendees, examples of perspectives expressed during the SLFs included the following:

- An increase in irregular challenges confronting the Armed Forces (and its support structures) which remains largely designed for conventional operations.
- A changed geo-strategic context and contemporary operational environment from familiar, nation-state based threats to national security (for example, USSR and NK) to diverse, non-nation-state based groups using terrorism to threaten national security or societal way of life.
- A perception that the activities of operational command have become more complex.
- A perception that operational design language is inadequate for the task of problem framing and understanding.
- A perception that operational design processes are insufficient to help the commander understand and visualize the mix of irregular and traditional threats.
- The necessity to integrate interagency, multinational, and nongovernmental partners into U.S. solution strategies.
- Military unfamiliarity with useful emerging scientific and social theories.
- Projections of the future operating environment competing among the multiple alternate futures postulated from within the U.S. Government, private industry, and academia.
- Changes in service employment concepts that increase dynamic, independent action in a non-linear operational environment.
• The perceived inadequacy of current joint and Army operational doctrine to address these challenges.

It must be clearly noted that these statements are not consensus opinion, but individual perceptions. Yet, perceptions become reality and lead to the questions, “What caused these conditions to develop?” “What are the links and relationships between cause and effect?” While some causal chains are often extremely difficult to decipher—if at all—other patterns are clear: a changed geo-strategic context, traditional problem solving, planning processes, and the difficulty of integrating multiple partners in unified action. Regardless of the level of clarity, the main features of current operational level problems lie in the key ideas developed in the following section. Facing these changing or problematic conditions requires time and effort to adapt, but now is the time to re-think conventional theories, methods, and processes to accommodate the new realities of this environment.

**Key Ideas**

The participants at the Senior Leader Forums discussed many ideas, but four key ones emerged for examination in this paper: theory of conflict, complexity, understanding, and strategic art. There was concern that the theory of war underlying the fundamental American approach to warfare may need refinement through the adoption of a wider theory of conflict based on ‘conflicts over ideas,’ which is broader than a state-based theory of war. Several leaders expressed concern about the complexity of the operational environment. There may be value in borrowing concepts from those who study complexity in other professions. Grappling with a complex operational problem is also linked to the idea that commanders at the operational level must thoroughly understand the operational problems they have been asked to solve. Finally, the general officer steering committee directed the writing team to assess the value of strategic art as a new body of professional knowledge. In the current struggle, the rise of irregular threats, whose presence extends across established geographic combatant command boundaries makes the design, articulation, and execution of strategy more important. These ideas are developed in more detail below.

**Key Idea #1: Theory of Conflict**

The purpose and usefulness of theory is served when a general description, explanation, and prediction is given for a phenomena over time. The Clauswitzian theory, description, and model of war as an “act of force to compel our enemy to do our will” and “continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means,” remain relevant from the SLF participants’ perspective. The enduring characteristics of war were neither directly challenged nor disputed. And yet, as Jacob Bronowski noted: “Every theory, however majestic, has hidden assumptions which are open to challenge and, indeed, in time will make it necessary to replace it…every theory is based in some analogy, and sooner or later the theory fails because the analogy turns

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1 These perspectives may be incomplete; nevertheless, the paper is not assessing their completeness, truth, or falsity. A former commander at the operational level or other senior leader’s perception of reality is rarely a matter of debate – perception is subjective. The friction lies in the interpretation and translation.

out to be false. A theory in its day helps to solve the problems of the day.”

Even Clausewitz had misgivings regarding the utility of theory as a simplification of reality: a reality which is neither simple nor stable. And finally, the difficulty with theory is “the defining characteristic of warfare is precisely the inevitable distance that separates the reality of it from its model.”

SLF participants offered the possible need for a broader view of warfare; an amplification—not a substitution—of Clauswitzian theory. The notion of war implies violence between states or nations, including what Clausewitz called “a people in arms.” A general theory of conflict, based on the competition of contradictory ideas, would be more encompassing than a theory of war between states and emphasize the importance of ideas and information. It would help explain the complex context of current realities brought about by a changed geo-strategic and operational environment—from familiar, nation-state-based threats to diverse, non-nation-state based groups using terrorism to threaten national security or societal way of life. It would also assist in understanding current and future operational-level problems holistically as well as enabling unified action.

The development of a general theory of conflict built on ideas will enhance the importance of IO. As one operational-level commander with experience in Iraq recently noted, “We must consider how tactical actions will influence the operational and strategic levels.” More than that, considerations of the message our actions convey must begin during mission analysis and course of action development, not as an afterthought. Frequently, it is our planning culture to think of actions first and supporting messages second, whereas some of our opponents think of actions as the message. In order to pursue a general theory of conflict, it will require more examination. Part of this examination begins with an understanding of systems and complexity.

**Key Idea #2: Complexity**

Holistic examination of command at the operational level implies a requirement for understanding systems and the impact of complexity on those systems. A system may be described as a network of many variables in causal relationship to one another, an interconnected set of elements or units where change in one element produces change in other elements, and the whole exhibits properties and behaviors different from the individual parts. JP 5-0 recognizes systems and the importance of developing a systems understanding as a process that supports the JFC’s decisionmaking and planning. A systems understanding is needed “to provide a perspective of interrelated systems that comprise…the increasingly complex and interconnected operational environment—the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.”

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5 Ibid.
7 Unified Quest 2007, Senior Leader Seminar (5 May 2007).
8 For the purpose of the paper, an operational problem is a discrepancy between the state of affairs as it is and the state of affairs as it ought to be that compels military action to resolve it.
Complexity, in general terms, is “a state of affairs that has many interacting, different components,” and lies in a range between simple order and chaos.\(^9\) Interactively complex systems are based on the behavior of individual elements and the freedom of interactions between all elements. These “systems can often exhibit unpredictable, surprising, and uncontrollable behaviors.”\(^10\) In contrast, structurally complex systems are based solely on the number of elements or parts in the system — the greater the number of parts, the greater the complexity. Practitioners in the physical, social, and behavioral sciences—with their high degree of individual specialization — have realized that the complex nature of systems requires an interdisciplinary holistic approach.\(^11\) This is nothing new for military leaders who understand the purposeful inclusion of relevant stakeholders to problem resolution. Yet, the most complex systems are those that exhibit both structural and interactive complexity such as that found within the current operational environment. As these systems interact—both internally and externally — the consequences, causal chains, and behaviors are immensely intricate and often unpredictable. The interactivity among and within systems complicates planning and problem solving. A traditional, systematic approach is insufficient for understanding and problem solving given the context of the Armed Forces’ responsibilities; leaders can no longer focus solely on the regular forces of a rival state.

The traditional way to plan and solve problems in a structurally complex system is by following an orderly, systematic process, working from the problem to the solution. This is the systems analysis approach which follows a series of prescribed steps: first, understand the type of problem; second, gather information to understand its context from the point of view of the problem itself; third, analyze the information; fourth, generate solutions; fifth, assess the solutions and decide which one is best; sixth, implementation; seventh, test; and eighth, modify the solution and learn for the next time.\(^12\) In essence, solutions follow an orderly sequence until the problem is solved. This has been the traditional wisdom in solving structurally complex problems and this method is still taught. However, when this approach is used to plan for and solve problems involving interactively complex systems, (persistent crime, illegal drugs, and failing schools, for example) it does not work well. The problems and conditions found at the operational level of command tend to fall into this latter category and therefore must be understood in the context of interactively complex systems.

**What happened and why does the systems analysis approach, for real life problems, fall short?**

The physical sciences, for example, physics, chemistry, and engineering, have a traditional process that serves to gather and produce knowledge. These ideals, principles, and systematic procedures have influenced planning and problem solving for interactively complex social


\(^11\) General System Theory (GST) was first announced in 1945, but the work of Bertalanffy began as early as 1937. As a biologist, he developed his theory as a result of classical science’s shortcomings: it was embedded in trying to establish an explanatory and predictive system of laws, but neglected many of the biological, behavioral, and sociological problems. Also it was concerned primarily with two-variable problems, i.e. one-way causal trains—one cause and one effect. But many problems in biology, behavioral and social science are multivariable problems for which new conceptual tools were needed. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, *General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications*, revised ed. (New York: George Braziller, 1969), pp. 91-93.

\(^12\) Rittel, p. 391. Rittel referred to this approach as ‘the first generation approach.’
problems. A systems analysis approach is unlikely to help planners solve interactively complex problems for two reasons: first is the “paradox of rationality,” and second is the nature of the problem itself. It would be rational in planning to try and understand the problem as a whole, examining all possible consequences for contemplated actions. However once this process of examination begins, the planner continues to determine all possible consequences for subsequent actions, exponentially increasing the number of possibilities. Logic suggests there is no reason to stop as long as time is available. Only when time runs out does the planner stop tracing consequences. Developing causal chains of consequences further into the future does not help – as it introduces greater and greater uncertainty into the model. Lastly, one needs a causal description of the environment in which actions create consequences. In order to create this description, it must contain all factors or phenomena that are important. The implication here is that the broad model of the problem must include the model itself, which is problematic as the actions within the model may change the environment within which it operates. In other words, the model must contain itself, which is not possible.

The second reason a systems analysis approach is unlikely to help planners solve problems of interactively complex systems is the nature of the problem itself. Problems generally tend to be either well-defined or ill-defined, but again there is no definitive polarity. Examples of well-defined, or tame, problems are quadratic equations, chess or crossword puzzles, chemical analysis problems, or problems of optimization, such as, operations research. These problems reside inside structural systems and although often very difficult to solve, all the information is available to the problem solver; they are linear problems. Problems of interactively complex systems cannot be solved using a systems analysis approach. These types of problems can be categorized as ill-defined or wicked. The properties of wicked problems were first illustrated by Horst Rittel in the early 1970s. While the context for wicked problems originated from urban planning, the properties remain relevant to all open societal, interactively complex, systems. Listed below are the properties of wicked problems.

**There is no definitive way to formulate a wicked problem.** Given a tame problem, it is possible to formulate the problem with all the information necessary to solve it – provided that the problem-solver knows his method. However, this is not possible with wicked problems. The information needed to understand the problem depends upon how one intends to solve it. And the solution depends upon how one understands the problem, or how one answers the question: “What is causing this problem?” Wicked problems rarely have a single cause, and different stakeholders will see the relationships between the causes and their prioritization differently. Thus, understanding and formulation depend to some degree upon perspective of the problem-solver rather than objective truth. This is not to say that the objective conditions do not exist, but our perception of these conditions as a problem that must be solved is itself subjective. (If it does not merit solution, it might merely be a concern; a “problem” implies solutions while

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13 Rittel.
14 Rittel.
15 Rittel, p. 392.
“concern” does not.) Thus a wicked problem cannot be known, but must instead be constructed. As John Schmitt notes, “Understanding a wicked problem is not a matter of capturing reality sufficiently correctly, but of constructing an interpretation that is sufficiently useful in dealing with the reality.”

We cannot understand a wicked problem without proposing a solution. Understanding the problem and conceiving a solution are identical and simultaneous cognitive processes. For example, if we formulate an insurgency as the result of a failed regional economy, our solution will be different than if we formulated the insurgency as the result of poor governance. The formulation of the problem points in the direction of a particular solution. This insight will be discussed at greater length in the section below on understanding.

Every wicked problem is essentially unique and novel. Historical analogies may provide useful insights, particularly on individual aspects of a larger problem, but the differences between even similar situations are profound and significant. The political goals at stake, stakeholders involved, cultural milieu, histories, and other dynamics will all be novel and unique to a particular situation.

Wicked problems have no fixed set of potential solutions. Since each wicked problem is a one-of-a-kind situation, it requires a custom solution rather than a standard solution modified to fit circumstances. Tactical doctrine offers standard templates for action, standard ways of doing things that have to be adapted to specific circumstances. Strategic and operational level leaders have no similar kit of generic solutions. The dynamics that make an operational problem unique also demand the design of a custom solution. Additionally, there is no way to prove that “all solutions to a wicked problem have been identified and considered.” Some solutions may never be considered, either because they are too exotic or because self-imposed constraints limit potential actions.

Solutions to wicked problems are better-or-worse, not true-or-false. There is no objective measure of success and different stakeholders may disagree about the quality of a solution. The suitability of a solution will depend upon how the individual stakeholders have formulated the problem and what constituted success.

Wicked problems are interactively complex. Operational problems are socially complex because people have tremendous freedom of interaction. Interactively complex problems are non-linear. In other words, a relatively minor action can create disproportionately large effects. The same action performed later may produce a different result. Interactive complexity makes effects difficult to explain and predict.

Every solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot operation.” Every attempted course of action has effects that create a new situation and cannot be undone. The consequences of

18 Schmitt, p. 10.
19 Neustadt and May, 34-57.
20 Rittel and Webber, p. 164.
military action are effectively irreversible. Whenever actions are irreversible and the duration of their effects is long, every attempted action counts.

**There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem.** The perceived quality of a solution to a wicked problem can change over time. Speaking metaphorically, yesterday’s solution might appear good today, but disastrous tomorrow as the unintended effects become clearer. In the discussion of measures of effectiveness, JP 5-0 notes that measurable results to a particular action may not appear for some time. This time lag complicates assessment enormously because in the interval the operational command may have executed other actions, which will make assessing cause and effect very difficult.

**Wicked problems have no “stopping rule.”** It is impossible to say conclusively that a wicked problem has been solved in the sense that a student knows when he has solved a math problem. Work on a wicked problem will continue until strategic leaders judge the situation is “good enough,” or until national interest, will, or resources for continuing have been diverted or exhausted.

**Every wicked problem is a symptom of another problem.** The causal explanation for a problem will determine the range of possible solutions. Yet, solving one problem often reveals another ‘higher level’ problem of which the original one was a symptom. The level at which an operational problem is solved depends among other things upon the authority, confidence, and resources of a particular commander. One should not simply cure symptoms, but should rather strive to solve the problem on as high a level as possible. However, if the problem is formulated at too high a level the broader and more general it becomes, and therefore the less likely it is to solve particular aspects of the operational problem.

**The problem-solver has no right to be wrong.** The writ of an operational commander and his staff is to improve the state of affairs in the world as it is perceived by his countrymen. Like others in government service, he is responsible for the consequences of the actions he generates. This description of wicked problems has significant implications for how operational level commanders solve complex operational problems. Any approach to solving wicked problems must put a heavy emphasis on first understanding operational problems.

**Key Idea #3: Understanding**

The complexity of the current operational environment has expanded the U.S. military’s conception of understanding in several ways. Reflecting recent operational experience, joint doctrine published within the past year firmly establishes the importance of understanding and that this understanding must be systemic and shared. A comparison of the 2001 and 2006 editions of JP 3-0 reveals that the discussion of understanding has shifted in subtle, yet very significant ways.

The 2001 edition of JP 3-0 divided understanding into two directions, internal and external. First, it required understanding the mission, commander’s intent, objective, and conditions for victory. These paragraphs focused attention internally because they emphasized understanding the commander’s vision for success. This version also required joint warfighters to understand the “capabilities, intentions, and possible actions of potential opponents as well as the geography,
weather, demographics, and culture(s) of the operational area.” These paragraphs focused externally on the adversary and the terrain (both geographic and human) in the AO. The emphasis was limited to the military capabilities of the adversary.

This conception was adequate for traditional, state-versus-state warfare and peacekeeping. However, the complexity of the current fight has forced our conception of understanding to shift. The 2006 edition of JP 3-0 underscores the importance of a systemic understanding of the operational environment. Because the two words sound similar, systemic is often misunderstood to mean systematic, but the two words have completely different meanings. Systematic describes a method that has carefully defined, ordered steps. Ironically, although such methods are relatively easy to describe, they are generally not suitable for gaining an appreciation\(^{21}\) of a complex problem. Additionally, cognitive researchers now recognize that humans do not actually think in such an ordered, methodical way.\(^{22}\)

Systemic, on the other hand, is a word drawn from systems theory that is a synonym for holistic. The importance of a systemic understanding is described in the current JP 3-0: “A systems perspective of the operational environment strives to provide an understanding of interrelated systems – political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, and others – relevant to a specific joint operation without regard to geographic boundaries.”

Thus, in contrast to earlier editions, the current JP 3-0 calls for studying systems that are not strictly military and without regard for their geographic boundaries. The earlier version was focused much more heavily on military capabilities and a specific AO. This is not to imply that earlier doctrine did not address non-military factors. However, it did not identify the other interrelated systems as key components of complex operational problems, nor did it address understanding operational problems using a systems perspective. This shift from a generally narrow military view toward a systemic view of the operational environment in joint doctrine requires us to re-examine our approach to command and staff functions at the operational level.

Commanders should frame campaigns in terms of solving operational problems. This paper defines an operational problem thus: a discrepancy between the state of affairs as it is and the state of affairs as it ought to be that compels military action to resolve it. Not all discrepancies require action, and these are more accurately called “concerns.” National leaders may not like the fact that a concern exists, but its negative effect on our national interests and values is not severe enough – when compared to the cost or potential for solution – to require military action. Current doctrine discusses the operational environment, in which the problem resides, and the mission, which is the operational-level commander’s statement about what the command will do to solve the problem. Nevertheless, joint doctrine should speak directly about the operational problem itself, especially for commanders who are in charge of a campaign. This is because operational problems have most if not all of the attributes of a wicked problem as described by

\(^{21}\) Appreciation is the act of estimating the qualities of things and giving them their proper value. It is essentially an understanding of the nature or meaning or quality or magnitude of the situation before you. For the purposes of military operations, an “appreciation” allows the commander to design, plan, and execute and most importantly adapt his actions within the operational environment, through learning about the nature and context of the operational problems, as the campaign unfolds.

Rittel, Webber, and Schmitt. Since there is no definitive way to formulate a wicked problem and since each wicked problem is unique and novel, an operational commander must formulate each problem himself. However, as stated before, it is impossible to understand a wicked problem without proposing a solution.

At issue is whether an operational-level commander should begin by analyzing his mission, or whether complexity compels commanders at this level to first try to understand a wicked operational problem, and then, based upon that understanding, design a broad approach to problem solving. The answer to this question depends upon the problem and the mission. If the problem is structured so that professionals can agree on how to solve it, and the mission received from higher headquarters is properly framed and complete, then it makes sense to begin with the analysis of the mission (breaking it down into specified, implied, and essential tasks). However, if the problem is unstructured (professionals cannot agree on a “best solution”), or the mission received from higher headquarters is not properly framed (for example, it is inappropriate for this problem), or higher headquarters provided no clear guidance, then it is crucial to begin by starting to identify and understand the operational problem systemically.

Unfortunately for combatant commanders and operational-level JFCs, wicked problems, incorrectly framed missions, and a lack of clear guidance are common challenges.

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**Figure D-3: Types of Problems and Solution Strategies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem Structuring</th>
<th>Well-Structured “Puzzle”</th>
<th>Medium-Structured “Structurally Complex Problem”</th>
<th>Ill-Structured “Wicked Problem”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structuring</td>
<td>The problem is self-evident. Structuring is trivial.</td>
<td>Professionals easily agree on its structure.</td>
<td>Professionals will have difficulty agreeing on problem structure and will have to agree on a shared starting hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Solution Development| There is only one right solution. It may be difficult to find. | There may be more than one “right” answer. Professionals may disagree on the best solution. Desired end state can be agreed. | Professionals will disagree on:  
  - How the problem can be solved.  
  - The most desirable end state.  
  - Whether it can be attained. |
| Execution of Solution| Success requires learning to perfect technique. | Success requires learning to perfect technique and adjust solution. | Success requires learning to perfect technique, adjust solution, and refine problem framing. |
| Adaptive Iteration  | No adaptive iteration required. | Adaptive iteration is required to find the best solution. | Adaptive iteration is required both to refine problem structure and to find the best solution. |

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23 Note that the approach an operational-level commander might use to gain an appreciation for an operational problem may occur within the existing planning step called Mission Analysis. The point here is that the approach used would be different than analysis of tasks. It is similar in some respects to the Commander’s Battlespace Area Evaluation (CBAE), which is part of Mission Analysis in the Marine Corps Planning Process. See MCWP 5-1, pp. 2-2 through 2-3.
However, these challenges are not the result of strategic leaders who have failed to perform. Instead, statements about “incorrectly framed missions,” or “a lack of clear guidance” should be understood strictly in comparison to tactical orders, which are usually precise and very specific. Training manuals have formulated most of the missions a tactical unit will perform and defined them in very precise language – the difference between “seize” and “secure,” for example.

However, operational problems are wicked, and thus there exists no definitive formulation of the problems operational-level commanders will face and there are no fixed set of solutions. Strategic guidance is often permissive and gives the operational commander wide latitude for action, precisely because strategic leaders depend upon operational-level commanders both to understand problems and design a broad problem-solving approach. In contrast to tactical-level orders, missions given to operational-level commanders are more often a start point for discourse rather than a definitive statement about what must be done. Thus, an “incorrectly framed mission” is an accurate statement, but it does not imply that someone has not done their job. Instead, it is appropriate for a strategic leader to rely upon commanders at the operational level to help him understand operational problems and provide the best military advice for solving them.

JP 3-0 identifies the importance of developing a shared understanding with JIM partners, and between echelons of command. This shared understanding ought first to incorporate an appreciation for the operational problem, and this appreciation needs to be shared not just laterally with other partners, but also vertically with superiors and subordinates. Many officers with recent operational experience on high-level staffs have seen the dynamic where one headquarters requests a subordinate to develop a plan to deal with a problem. The initial guidance is somewhat vague because the higher headquarters is not in a position to understand the operational problem completely; it simply recognizes the unwanted symptoms. The lower headquarters, using its more detailed understanding of the operational problem, develops a plan and presents it to the higher headquarters. What frequently happens next is that the higher headquarters publishes the lower headquarters’ plan as its own and tells its subordinate to execute.

This demonstrates that orders may flow from higher to lower, but understanding often flows from lower to higher – especially between strategic and operational-level commands, and especially when the operational problems are complex. Often, a combatant commander or other joint force commander, like the commander of Multinational Force Iraq (MNF-I), is better positioned to understand the full scope of an operational problem than his superiors. If an operational commander’s first task is to understand the operational equivalent of a wicked problem, then it should be incumbent upon him to share this understanding with his superiors early in the planning process. To illustrate this recommendation, consider the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System planning model depicted in JP 5-0, figure I-3. Commanders should brief both their understanding of the operational problem as well as their missions during their first IPR with the Secretary of Defense (see figure 4 below).
The 2006 edition of JP 3-0 also focused more squarely on the commander’s understanding rather than the understanding of the staff or subordinate commanders. In the 2001 edition, the emphasis on understanding the internal elements of the friendly plan – things like commander’s intent – clearly indicated that the burden of understanding was on people other than the commander himself. (One must assume that the commander understood his own intent.) In contrast, the 2006 edition discusses that it is important for the commander himself to understand the operational environment. The Army’s FM 3-0 is moving in a similar direction, inserting understanding as a precursor to the other roles of a commander in the battle command model (see figure 5).
statement, particularly since JIPOE would seem to perform this function. But what commanders require is something different, something harder to visualize because it does not yet exist. However, several of the features of JIPOE should also be features of the approach that commanders use to gain an appreciation for operational problems. JIPOE creates a holistic systems perspective of the adversary and the operational environment. The commander’s appreciation should also be holistic and use a systems perspective, and JIPOE should be one of the most important inputs, but not the only one. Despite their similarities, the desired approach and JIPOE are different in purpose, scope, method, and level of detail.

Before describing in broad terms the type of approach operational-level commanders need, it is first worth discussing some of the reasons why processes like JIPOE are not sufficient for understanding complex operational problems. For purposes of illustration, consider a headquarters conducting a counterinsurgency campaign. Within this staff a specially-created cell maintains estimates on indigenous security forces, including their loyalty, training, leadership, equipment, funding, and effectiveness. The provost marshal maintains similar information specifically for the police, the judiciary, and the penal system. The engineer has data about oil production and consumption of electricity. The civil affairs section has data on community infrastructure, such as schools, hospitals, fresh water supply, and sewers, and has analysis of periodic public opinion polling. Yet, this will not be the only section with public opinion data. The intelligence section has analysis of weekly sermons, the operations section has indications gleaned from patrol reports, and the public affairs section has assessments of local print and television media.

Boards, bureaus, centers, and cells may integrate these individual threads, but they do this for specific purposes (targeting for example) not to create a systemic appreciation of the overall operational problem. On a large operational-level staff, there are many different staff sections with important pieces of the overall operational problem, but ultimate responsibility for synthesis and understanding rests solely upon the commander.

Yet, what commanders at the operational level need is something more appropriate than merely stitching together the estimates from across the staff. Commanders do not need the reams of detail that a staff analyst requires. With reference to the popular idiom about not seeing the forest for the trees, the commander must be able to see the whole forest. Determining what is “good enough” with respect to information is an art, but it is an art already practiced by commanders today.

Staff estimates do not question existing frames of reference, but the commander’s appreciation methodology must. The analysis in a staff estimate will naturally be shaped by the expected mission. The estimates will be shaped by the theoretical framework, or paradigm, of the anticipated campaign. However, the commander cannot allow his understanding to be framed this way because the mission received from higher headquarters may not be the best course. It is also very likely at the operational level of command that no mission was actually received in the

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24 The next edition of JP 2-01.3 will describe the JIPOE process. Although it has not been published yet, JP 5-0 contains a general description of the process (pp. III-16 thru III-19). The draft JP 2-01.3 Program Directive, dated 12 June 2007, provides a chapter outline.
formal sense of receiving a list of tasks. Questioning orders may appear on the surface to be disloyal, but with a full understanding of the operational problem it may be essential for success. Whether an operational commander reports to civilian strategic leaders or another military headquarters, both rely upon the operational level commander for his best military advice and judgment. He must develop an understanding of the operational problem and share this understanding with his superiors. This shared understanding should shape the mission, not the other way around. Writing about senior policy makers in government, Richard Neustadt and Ernest May note that there is “a natural tendency to react to trouble by saying, ‘Damn! What do we do?’ instead of ‘What is our problem?’” It is incumbent upon operational-level commanders to develop a shared understanding of the problem in concert with their superiors.

The commander’s approach for appreciating the operational problem should have the following characteristics. It must allow the commander to:

- **Participate himself.** In order to develop his own understanding, the commander must be a participant rather than merely a recipient or an observer.

- **Observe reality from outside the existing frame or paradigm.** Missions received from superiors may be incomplete, wrong, or non-existent to a degree not experienced at lower echelons of command. This does not imply a failure of strategic leadership. Instead, strategic leaders must rely upon operational-level commanders to help them understand national security problems. As one operational-level commander with recent experience described it, “One … question I found myself asking more than any other question was, ‘What are we trying to accomplish? What do we want the subordinate guys to accomplish?’ and the higher up you get, the harder it is to figure that out.” The operational-level commander’s understanding will often be better than his superiors in many respects because he is closer to the problem and therefore has more time and resources to focus on understanding it. Therefore, operational-level commanders must begin by learning about the operational problem.

- **Question the limits of existing knowledge.** Operational level commanders must accept that they will always confront gaps in knowledge and therefore imperfect understanding. They must always question judgments and build into their planning ways to fill the gaps that exist.

- **Gain a holistic understanding, yet one that is undetailed and incomplete.** Like JIPOE, a commander should consider every system and aspect of an operational problem—not just the ones we have traditionally thought of as military. As mentioned previously, the commander must focus on understanding the forest rather than the trees, yet even the best understanding will be incomplete. Interactive complexity makes eliminating the fog of war impossible.

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25 Participants at SLF IV discussed a situation where a Joint Force Commander did not receive a mission or intent, and had to develop his mission on his own with very little authoritative guidance.

26 Neustadt and May, p. 38.

27 Unified Quest 2007, Senior Leader Seminar.
• **Synthesize analysis.** The commander’s understanding must be a synthesis of the different perspectives and analyses brought to him by his staff, subordinate commanders, superiors, multinational partners, and interagency peers.

• **Initiate paradigm shifts.** As discussed earlier, the formulation of a wicked problem naturally establishes the paradigm for the solution. If the commander and his superior come to share an understanding of the operational problem that is different from the superior’s original conception, then it follows that this shared understanding may shift the broad approach the command uses to solve the problem.

• **Set logical boundaries for planning.** The paradigm or broad problem-solving approach will frame the problem more clearly for those who must conduct the detailed planning for execution.

Furthermore, a study of how people think, or human cognition, indicates that this approach should be based upon discourse in order to promote critical dialogue and rigorous thinking. Discourse is the candid exchange of ideas without fear of retribution that results in a synthesis and a shared visualization of the operational problem. The goal of the commander, his subordinate commanders, and staff is to consider and synthesize many different perspectives and ideas. Groupthink is the antithesis of healthy discourse. A zero defects command climate will throttle learning because successful discourse requires candor and the free, yet mutually respectful, competition of opposing ideas. Participants must be free to take minority viewpoints based upon their expertise, experience, and insight; this includes sharing ideas that contradict the opinions held by those of higher rank.

Successfully wrestling with complexity through the use of discourse was illustrated fifty years ago during Project Solarium. When the Eisenhower Administration came to office in 1953, Dwight Eisenhower himself was concerned that NSC-68 had committed the U.S. to policies that were unsustainable.\(^{29}\) The administration was divided over several alternative strategies that appeared irreconcilable. In order to help him solve this problem, the president directed the NSC to form teams of advocates for each alternative from the agencies and departments with a stake in the outcome. Each team was charged to “take an alternative and tackle it with a real

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\(^{29}\) The Truman Administration produced NSC-68 in 1950. This National Security Council memorandum was the first to comprehensively frame American Cold War strategy.
belief in it just the way a good advocate tackles a law case.”

On 16 July 1953, each team presented its strategy to the NSC principals in a special session at National Defense University with “maps, charts, all the basic supporting figures and estimates, just what each alternative would mean in terms of goal, risk, cost in money and men and world relations.” Each team presented its case and was questioned by the others. In the end, Eisenhower was able to take the best ideas from the three teams and to combine them into the strategy codified in NSC-162/2.

Critical to this process, the President himself was directly involved and was willing to let subordinates challenge even his most basic assumptions. As Eisenhower later stated in an interview, “I know of only one way in which you can be sure you have done your best to make a wise decision. That is to get all of the [responsible policymakers] with their different points of view in front of you, and listen to them debate.” Unlike Project Solarium, which concluded with the publication of NSC-162/2 on 30 October 1953, the approach that operational level commanders use to gain an appreciation of a complex operational problem must continue throughout the campaign.

One aspect of wicked problems is that the effects of today’s action are irreversible and create a new problem tomorrow. This does not mean that operational problems fundamentally change from day to day. Usually the changes are incremental and even fundamental changes may take a while to become manifest. However, the certainty of change makes it essential for operational-level commanders to assess continuously, even designing his operations to help him learn about and understand the operational problem. Maintaining an ongoing discourse with staff, peers, subordinates, and superiors is essential to maintaining a shared understanding.

When the operational problem does fundamentally change, it must drive the commander to reframe the problem. Again the formulation of the new problem may indicate that the approach to solving it must change as well. The appreciation of the problem and the maintenance of a shared understanding require a continuous dialog and discourse throughout the campaign. This discourse with strategic leaders is particularly important, not just because the dynamics of the conflict on the battlefield might change, but because national aims might shift as well.

Grappling with wicked problems is at the core of operational art. However, strategic leaders also face wicked problems, albeit from a higher and wider perspective than operational-level commanders. Several of the participants at SLF II asked whether these functions as practiced by strategists are different enough to warrant exploration of strategic art as a separate field.

Key Idea #4: Strategic Art

Joint operations always occur under the umbrella of a larger strategy, so discussion of operational-level command must consider the strategic context. A set of national strategic objectives, approved by the President, typically will guide the commitment of U.S. instruments.

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31 Bowie and Immerman.

of national power. Just as large-scale military operations are inherently joint; these operations also occur in conjunction with other agencies that represent U.S. instruments of national power. The supported military commander often will have a role in achieving more than one national objective. Some national objectives will be the primary responsibility of this commander, while others will require a more balanced use of all instruments of national power, with the military in support of other agencies.

Operational art helps the military commander integrate ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. This construct is relevant to commanders at the operational level because operational art is a thought process commanders use to visualize how best to employ military capabilities to accomplish their mission efficiently and effectively. Operational art also promotes unified action by helping JFCs and staffs understand how to facilitate the integration of other agencies and multinational partners toward achieving the national strategic end state, typically expressed as a set of national strategic objectives.

Strategic- and operational-level commanders face a number of challenges to achieving success in these operations. For example, failure of operational-level military and other agency leaders to reach a common understanding of a clearly stated strategic purpose and objectives for a specific operation can cause failure to achieve those objectives. Similarly, failure of strategic leaders to articulate clear strategic purpose and objectives can cause mission failure at the operational level regardless of tactical success. Also, failure to coordinate and integrate national capabilities effectively during planning and execution, even when strategic purpose and objectives are clear and understood, can limit both strategic and operational success. SLF participants agreed in particular that the coordination and integration of other national agency capabilities and actions with military operations is a complex strategic and operational challenge. As a mechanism to address this challenge, the participants generally agreed that there could be value in extending the idea of operational art to the strategic level by establishing a strategic-art construct.

Seminar participants discussed the notion of strategic art briefly in SLF II and more extensively in SLF III. The discussion revolved around the questions: “Is there such a thing as strategic art and is it separate and distinct from operational art? Do we know what it is and just aren’t defining it….or do we have to start a whole new body of discussion to try to figure out what strategic art is?”

Participants discussed two specific aspects to these questions. The first aspect concerned the potential value of developing a strategic art construct. A logical framing question for this investigation would be, “Are the current definitions for operational art and operational design relevant to the development of strategic concepts for employing the military instrument of national power in a specific crisis?” A closely related follow-on question would be, “Can commanders and planners apply the current or modified elements of operational design (or new elements) at the strategic level?” Clearly, design elements such as termination, end state, objective, and center of gravity already apply, since senior leaders use these elements in planning. Other elements, such as culmination and decisive points, might have less (if any) utility at this level.
The second aspect of the strategic art discussion related to consensus among SLF participants that strategic art involved not just the military instrument of national power, but the interaction of the broader interagency community. One participant summed up this view with the opinion that there should be something “…that would bring the DIM and E together in a combined arms fashion with a common language, a common vocabulary, a common way of thinking of perhaps an uncommon planning process, something that brings them together better than what we have right now.” Figure 6 proposes a definition of strategic art and a model that relates strategic art to operational art and unified action. The definition has three key components: instruments of national power; national objectives; and the ends-ways-means construct. The model suggests that strategic art encompasses both national- and theater-strategic objectives, and that the combatant commander and ambassadors are the key players in the strategic-operational art nexus.

Coordination between the military and other instruments of national power has long been recognized as important to achieving strategic objectives. U.S. joint doctrine uses the term unified action to represent the necessary interaction between military organizations and other agencies and organizations in an effort to synchronize and/or integrate joint or multinational military operations with the activities of these agencies. Even when the President provides clear strategic direction focused on well understood and achievable strategic objectives, a number of obstacles can inhibit interagency unity of effort. These include differences among the agencies in organizational culture, perspective, training, professional education, processes, budget, acceptable risk, and politics.

U.S. Joint Forces Command is exploring challenges related to strategic art in a Unified Action Project in conjunction with Department of State and other agencies. This project is an effort to address operations that involve military support to civilian-led operations at home and abroad.

![Figure D-6: Proposed Definition and Model](image)

The project resulted from the lack of U.S. government integrated planning and implementation
processes, the need to address the lack of civilian operational capacity, and the need for a paradigm shift in military concepts for working in civilian-led operations.

An important question that relates the two aspects of the strategic art issue is whether or not a strategic art construct (with elements of strategic design) can be crafted in such a way that it is useful in interagency planning, with unified action as the goal.

Conclusions
The Senior Leader Forums held between April 2006 and May 2007 resulted in the following observations:

- The complex nature of warfare presents commanders with relatively unstructured problems, which complicate situational understanding, planning, and decisionmaking at all levels of command.
- Understanding the problem is an essential underpinning of successful planning. Adjusting to changing circumstances (reframing the problem) is essential to mission accomplishment.
- The theater-strategic and operational-level commanders typically are the linchpins in the command chain, the commanders who use operational art and design to determine the resources and sequence of actions required to create the conditions that will achieve strategic objectives within an acceptable level of risk.
- Unified action between the military, multinational partners, and agencies is essential for successful solutions at all levels. In the U.S., unified action at the strategic level (discussed as strategic art in the SLF series) is especially challenging due to differences among agencies in culture, perspective, training, processes, and other factors.
- A sound, consensus-based theory of conflict is a fundamental underpinning of national strategy, strategic art (in the context of unified action), and military doctrine.

Areas for Further Study
The purpose of this section is to identify topics for further analysis and potential experimentation, development, and implementation.

Doctrine
Examine ways to solve complex operational problems, considering applicable ideas and concepts from complexity theory.

- Examine ways to help commanders develop their own shared and systemic understanding of complex operational problems using the principles described in this white paper. Develop a shared understanding among superiors, subordinates, interagency peers, multinational partners, and staff.
- Recognize that orders given at the strategic level are generally more permissive and ambiguous than those at lower levels. Additionally, recognize that subordinate operational-level commanders perform an essential role in assisting their superiors understand complex operational problems.
- Address how to work in conjunction with interagency partners in order to facilitate interoperability and unified action.
• Investigate the viability of applying operational art at the strategic level (for example, strategic art). Which elements of operational design are relevant to strategic use? Are new elements of strategic design required?

Leader Development
Address how potential operational-level commanders can integrate the capabilities of military and non-military instruments of national power.

• Increase the emphasis on solving complex operational problems in professional military education.
• Improve familiarity with non-military instruments of national power and non-military systems in the operational environment in professional military education and training.

Training
• Conduct Joint and Service training exercises that replicate the dynamics of operational-level command, including ambiguous situations, permissive orders, complex problem solving, unified action, and building a shared and systemic understanding of the operational environment.

Personnel
• Determine if there are gaps in providing the skills that are required at the operational level, for example, the analysis of economics as a system within the operational environment (PMESII) and the employment of the economic instrument of national power (DIME).

Challenges
Addressing the challenges associated with the major observations above requires a combination of continued study, wargaming, experimentation, doctrine refinement, professional military education, training, and analysis of current campaigns. TRADOC will address the challenge of understanding, framing, and reframing problems in key Army doctrinal publications and will recommend relevant changes to joint doctrine. USJFCOM has agreed to take on the strategic art challenge in the PINNACLE senior leader program for potential joint force commanders and in the continuing Unified Action Project in conjunction with Department of State and other agencies. As co-sponsors of the SLF series, both commands agree to continue the investigation of topics related to reaffirming the elements of a cohesive U.S. theory of conflict.

Note. This white paper was presented, reviewed, and discussed at Senior Leader Forum V. The authors will edit the paper consistent with the guidance received at the SLF. Once the final paper is approved by CDR, JFCOM and CG, TRADOC it is the intent to circulate the paper to the broadest extent possible in order to facilitate further work on the recommended avenues for further exploration and development. Additionally, the SLF co-sponsored events will continue to explore issues of command at the operational level in greater depth based on the recommendations from the co-sponsors and other GOSC.
Glossary

Section I
Abbreviations

AO area of operations
AOR area of operational responsibility
ARCIC Army Capabilities Integration Center
ARFORGEN Army force generation
ASCC Army service component commander
BCT brigade combat team
BPC building partnership capacity
CA civil affairs
CAC U.S. Combined Arms Center
CACD Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design
CCDR Combatant Commander
CJFACC Combined Joint Force Air Component Command
CJFMCC Combined Joint Force Maritime Component Command
CJFTSC Combined Joint Force Theater Sustainment Command
CJTF combined joint task force
CONOPS concept of operations
CONUS Continental United States
CSA Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
CTF combined task force
DA Department of the Army
DIME diplomatic, information, military, and economic
DOD Department of Defense
DOS Department of State
DOTMLPF doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities
FID foreign internal defense
FM field manual
FSO full spectrum operations
FWD Future Warfare Division
FWSP Future Warfare Study Plan
GCC geographic combatant command
GOSC general officer steering committee
IDAD internal defense and development
IDF Israeli Defense Force
IO information operations
JFC joint force commander
JIATF joint interagency task force
JIM joint, interagency, and multinational
JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
JOE joint operational environment
JP joint publication
JTF       joint task force
JUWTF     joint unconventional warfare task force
MARFOREUR U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe
MILGP     Military Assistance Group
MMA       major mission areas (non-doctrinal term)
MNC       multi-national corps
MSR       main supply route
NAVEUR    U.S. Naval Forces Europe
NCO       noncommissioned officer
NK        North Korea
NMS       national military strategy
NSC       National Security Council
NSS       National Security Strategy
PAM       pamphlet
PL        phase line
PMESII    political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information
PSYOP     psychological operations
SAO       security assistance organizations
SLS       Senior Leader Seminar
SOCEUR    Special Operations Command Europe
SOD       systemic operational design
SOF       special operations forces
SSTRO     stability, support, transition, and reconstruction operations
STAFFEX   staff planning exercise
SWG       seminar war game
TMAAG-F   Future Theater Military Advisory and Assistance Group
TRADOC    U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
UQ        Unified Quest (Army Title 10 USC War Game)
U.S.      United States
USAFE     United States Air Forces Europe
USAREUR   U.S. Army Europe
USAWC     U.S. Army War College
USC       United State Code
USEUCOM   U.S. European Command
USG       U.S. Government
USJFCOM   U.S. Joint Forces Command
USSOCOM   U.S. Special Operations Command
USSR      Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UW        unconventional warfare
WMD       weapons of mass destruction
WME       weapons of mass effectd
WWII      World War II
Section II
Terms

**Chief of mission**
The principal officer (the ambassador) in charge of a diplomatic facility of the United States, including any individual assigned to be temporarily in charge of such a facility. The chief of mission is the personal representative of the President to the country of accreditation. The chief of mission is responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all US Government executive branch employees in that country (except those under the command of a US area military commander). The security of the diplomatic post is the chief of mission’s direct responsibility. Also called COM. (JP 3-10)

**Country team**
The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic mission. (JP 3-07.4)

**Long war**
A term used in the *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review* to refer to “a global war against violent extremists who use terrorism as their weapon of choice, and who seek to destroy our free way of life.” (p. v) “The enemies in this war are not traditional conventional military forces but rather dispersed, global terrorist networks that exploit Islam to advance radical political aims. These enemies have the avowed aim of acquiring and using nuclear and biological weapons to murder hundreds of thousands of Americans and others around the world. They use terror, propaganda and indiscriminate violence in an attempt to subjugate the Muslim world under a radical theocratic tyranny while seeking to perpetuate conflict with the United States and its allies and partners.”

**Full spectrum operations**
The Army’s operational concept: Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. They employ synchronized action—lethal and nonlethal—proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operational environment. Mission command that conveys intent and an appreciation of all aspects of the situation guides the adaptive use of Army forces. (FM 3-0)

**Non-state actor**
A group or organization that is not within the formal structure of any state, that is not limited by any state boundary, and operates beyond the control of and without loyalty to any state. Examples include international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, political parties, labor unions, commercial trade associations, criminal enterprises, and armed groups such as insurgent and terrorist organizations, informal armed militias, and private military companies.
Moore’s Law
Moore’s Law refers to the trend of exponential improvement in the density achieved in integrated circuit design over time. That same trend applies to information technology, in general, in terms of speed and capacity as well as component density.

Persistent conflict
A characterization of the emerging security environment describing a period of protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors fueled by expanding ideological extremism, competition for energy, globalization outcomes, climate and demographic changes, and the increased use of violence to achieve political and ideological ends.

Wicked problems
Wicked problems have incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements, and solutions to them are often difficult to recognize as such because of complex interdependencies. While attempting to solve a wicked problem, the solution of one of its aspects may reveal or create other, even more complex problems. (Wikipedia)

Section III
Special Abbreviations and Terms

Persistent security
An enduring condition or state facilitated or provided by military forces that allows for the development and further application of a nation’s elements of national power in ways that enable a stable and lasting peace.